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The Implications of Cultural Background on Labour Market Choices: 
The Case of Religion and Entrepreneurship 
 
We suggest a methodology for identifying the implications of alternative cultural and social 
norms embodied by religious denomination on labour market outcomes, by estimating the 
differential impact of Protestantism versus Catholicism on the propensity to be an 
entrepreneur, on the basis of the diverse minority status of both confessions across 
European regions. Our quasi-experimental research design exploits the stronger degree of 
attachment to religious ethic of religious minorities and the exogenous historical 
determination of the geographical distribution of religious minorities in Europe. Our analysis 
of European Social Survey data collected in four waves between 2002 and 2008 in 22 
European countries, indicates that cultural background has a significant effect on the 
individual propensity to become an entrepreneur, with Protestantism increasing the chances 
to be an entrepreneur by around 3% with respect to Catholicism. Our findings, stable across 
a number of robustness checks, provide further evidence on the need to take cultural 
elements into consideration when analysing economic behaviour. 
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This paper investigates the implications of culture in terms of economic outcomes through 
the examination of the relationship between specific cultural norms embodied by religious 
denominations and the choice of becoming an entrepreneur. In other words, our question is 
whether the peculiar characteristics of a successful entrepreneur
3, such as intuition, courage, 
self-control, leadership, propensity to invest, are  favoured or not by a given cultural and 
ethical background embodied by religious denominations. 
In  our  analysis  the  word  “culture”  refers  to  religious  culture,  i.e.  that  inextricable 
combination of specific beliefs, traditions, ethical principles, sense of the good and the evil, 
which differentiate a religion and creates its own identity. The hypothesis we aim at testing is 
whether religious individuals may be subject, whether consciously or not, to a different set of 
constraints when taking decisions about their life and work career.  
In this respect, the choice of being an entrepreneur seems to be a natural outcome to be 
affected  by  cultural  constraints  because  of  the  peculiarities  of  self-employment  when 
compared to dependent employment. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) show  for example 
how the self-employed are generally more satisfied with their job than dependent employees, 
despite being subject to higher levels of stress. The trade-off between satisfaction and stress 
is potentially mediated on the values embodied by cultural background. In addition, this 
particular choice is indeed revealing as regards the real attitudes of individuals versus wealth 
accumulation and ambition of success.  
Entrepreneurs may indeed be considered the key players of a market economy,  for they 
embody the principles of capitalism and their seek of success stimulates innovation.  Given 
the  economic  relevance  of  this  figure,  understanding  the  implications  of  a  cultural 
background on the choice of becoming an entrepreneur seems to be a good test of whether 
there exists a causal effect of culture on economic behavior at all.  
                                                 
3  In what follows we will use the words entrepreneurs and self-employed interchangeably.  3 
 
In this respect, Europe represents a unique economic environment where to analyze the 
implications of religious denomination on the propensity of being an entrepreneur. In the 
first place, Europe is characterized by a relatively homogeneous economic environment, if 
compared to other areas of the world, and by a relevant proportion of entrepreneurs among 
employed individuals. Moreover, and most importantly, European religious denominations 
are  mainly  Christian,  with  two  variants  represented  by  Catholicism  and  Protestantism. 
Religious denominations are scattered across European regions, generating large variations 
in the proportion of Catholics and Protestants, whereas the overall economic and social 
environment varies only to a certain extent. Religious individuals are therefore quite similar 
on  average  as  regards  the  economic  environment  they  face  and  their  general  beliefs. 
However,  Catholic  and  Protestant  ethic  differ  on  some  important  specific  aspects.  Two 
relevant differences regard the questions of predestination and unmediated relation with 
God.  
Protestantism, and especially its Calvinist branch, maintains that God decides (or is aware of) 
who is to be elected or damned since the beginnings. Individuals ignore their own fate, but 
only the elected have the capacity to increase God’s glory during their life by means of their 
good works. Therefore achieving success in the worldly life, which is the precondition  for 
good  works  to  be  possible,  is  a  clear  symptom  of  election.  This  view  puts  success  in 
economic competition, material achievements and wealth accumulation, under a new light: 
rather than being considered sources of temptation and possible idolatry, or the outcome of 
the exploitation of the weak perpetrated by the strong, they witness the state of grace to 
both the individual and the community. In this new perspective, the typical purposes of 
capitalism are not only acceptable, but even morally desirable. Nonetheless, asceticism must 
inspire everyday life, as wealth has to be used  for good works and to the benefit of the 
community and not for the seek of personal pleasure.  
Quite at the opposite, Catholicism is historically rather cold if not hostile towards worldly 
success and competition. It emphasizes poverty and an isolated monastic life as the main 
avenue to achieve salvation. It reassures the poor and the weak, promising them eternal 
salvation, while the rich and the powerful will be punished for their sins.  4 
 
According to the Protestant ethic there is no need for intermediation between God and the 
human being, nor sacraments and confession have any significance, because everybody’s 
state  of  grace  is  predetermined.  Instead,  Protestants  are  encouraged  to  focus  on  self-
reflection  as  the  path  towards  God  is  a  personal  one.  This  conception  strengthens 
individualism  and  self-confidence,  two  important  personal  characteristics  in  a  capitalistic 
economy.  
Symmetrically, Catholicism emphasizes the role of the priest as mediator between God and 
men, and the only allowed to administer the sacraments required  for keeping or restoring 
the link with God. Much emphasis is also put on the need of a unique and standardized 
reading of the Scriptures, and personal interpretations are refused.  
In his classic contribution, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber (1904) 
argued that these specificities of Protestantism were crucial in inducing many individuals in 
pre-capitalistic societies to engage in secular activities. The spirit of capitalism, which in 
Weber’s work may be defined as the rational pursuit of economic profit and the morality 
attached to this scope, is fundamentally embodied by the attitude towards entrepreneurship 
activities. Weber’s theory is still to this day an important reference point  for contemporary 
research  on  this  topic.  In  a  recent  contribution,  Becker  and  Woessmann  (2009)  dispute 
Weber’s original stand, arguing that the prosperity of Protestant economies was mainly due 
to the generation of human capital induced by the Protestant instruction in reading the Bible, 
rather than to the peculiarities of Protestant ethic. 
In what follows, we do not directly test Weber’s original theory, since we do not investigate 
the historical process leading to the development of capitalism in Europe. We do however 
provide an empirical investigation on the cultural determinants of economic behavior in 
contemporary economies. More specifically, we adopt a quasi-experimental research design 
in  order  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  culture  and  economic  outcomes  by 
exploiting  the  specificity  of  religious  patterns  in  European  regions.  Our  emphasis  is  on 
carefully designing an identification strategy which may enable us to assess whether there 
exists a causal link  from religious norms to economic outcomes, rather than identifying 
which is the value-related channel that operates in this direction. 5 
 
In  a  spirit  similar  to  Gruber  (2005),  we  focus  on  the  structure  of  the  geographical 
distributions of religious creeds across Europe by looking at the minoritarian/majoritarian 
nature  of  Protestantism  and  Catholicism  in  each  European  region.  This  distribution  is 
mainly inherited from deep historical processes, which may be safely considered exogenous 
to individual labour market choices in current times. 
The idea is that individuals belonging to minority creeds, have on average deeper adherence 
to the bound of social and ethical norms carried by their religion, with respect to individuals 
belonging to majority creeds. This does not mean that majority religious individuals cannot 
individually personify their own religion’s values, but only that concentrating on minority 
individuals,  or  more  specifically  on  the  differential  impact  of  different  minority  religion 
creeds, we are more likely to identify the effect of religious ethic on economic outcomes. 
Using European Social Survey (ESS) data collected every two years from 2002 to 2008 in 22 
European  countries,  our  empirical  strategy  aims  at  capturing  the  differential  impact  of 
Protestant versus Catholic “ethics” net of all confounders related to the minority status of 
each religious denomination across European regions, and including a large set of controls at 
the  individual  as  well  as  at  the  regional  level.  Most  importantly,  ESS  data  also  include 
information about parents’ occupation. This is a crucial bit of information, as being raised in 
a  family  of  entrepreneurs  is  a  strong  predictor  of  the  propensity  of  becoming  an 
entrepreneur.      
According  to  our  empirical  findings,  Protestantism  does  indeed  favor  entrepreneurship. 
Our  key  result  is  that  Protestants  are  around  3  percentage  points  more  likely  to  be 
entrepreneurs than Catholics, after controlling  for individual,  family background, regional 
characteristics  and  country  or  regional  fixed  effects.  The  latter  fully  capture  common 
national/regional  cultural  traits,  in  addition  to  the  extent  to  which  legislation  and  fiscal 
policy favors entrepreneurship, and the national/regional entrepreneurial propensity.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between religion and 
entrepreneurship. Section 3 presents our identification strategy and tests its tenets while 
section 4 introduces the model. Data are presented in Section 5 and the estimation results in 6 
 
Section 6. The validity and robustness of our  findings are  further discussed in detail in 
Section 7. Section 8 finally concludes. 
 
2. Culture and religion as economic factors.  
 
Guiso  et  al.  (2006)  provide  a  general  introduction  to  the  role  of  cultural  traits  in  the 
economy and make a distinction between a slow-moving component of culture transmitted 
“fairly unchanged from generation to generation”, and a fast-moving component which may 
be illustrated by peer-group effects. An example of the  former could be represented by 
religious  beliefs.  According  to  the  authors,  a  cultural  tradition  may  be  the  result  of  an 
optimization process at societal level, but the cultural elements inherited by each individual 
are unaffected by individual experiences during their lifetime.  
Tabellini (2005) provides some empirical evidence on the effects of culture on economic 
outcomes, by measuring values and beliefs (such as trust, respect  for others, confidence in 
self-determination) at the regional level in Europe, and instrumenting them with a set of 
historical variables. As a result the exogenous regional component of culture is found to be 
correlated with current economic development. 
More recently, Giavazzi et al. (2009)  focus on the role played by cultural attitudes towards 
gender,  the  young  and  leisure,  by  showing  how  these  can  explain  women  and  young 
employment dynamics, as well as total hours worked in OECD countries.  
Guiso et al. (2009) show instead how trust of European citizens towards other countries, 
rooted in culture, can explain trade and foreign investment patterns. Under the Guiso et al. 
framework the link goes  from culture (deep) to beliefs and values, and  from beliefs and 
values to economic outcomes. 
The strand of economic research on religion has been inaugurated by Iannacone (1988). He 
views religious norms as endogenously produced by optimization at group-level. Thereafter, 
an increasing interest was devoted to the role and the mechanism of religion, both  from a 7 
 
theoretical  (e.g.  Benabou  and  Tirole,  2006)  and  an  empirical  perspective  (Gruber  and 
Hungerman, 2008, and Becker and Woessmann, 2009, discussed below, among others).  
However, the link between religion and the choice of becoming an entrepreneur has not 
been previously empirically investigated except  for  few papers, none of which adopts a 
quasi-experimental  approach  and  focus  on  the  specificities  of  Europe.  Audretsch  et  al. 
(2007)  find that in India Islam and Christianity  favors entrepreneurship, while Hinduism 
inhibits it. Minns and Rizov (2005) study entrepreneurship in Canada at the beginning of the 
20th  Century  and  find  that  Catholics  were  less  likely  to  become  entrepreneurs  than 
Protestants.  Guiso  et  al.  (2007)  conclude  that  “Buddhism  and  Christianity  seem  most 
conducive to capitalism, and Islam the least”. 
In the business literature there are several qualitative contributions. A detailed survey is 
offered by Dana (2009), where, among other things, examples of financial, employment and 
information  networks  that  emerge  between  people  of  the  same  religion  are  presented. 
Carswell and Rolland (2004) question whether the positive effect of Protestant work ethic on 
entrepreneurship could be negatively affected by the increasing ethnic and religious diversity 
associated to migration.   
In a recent paper Falck and Woessmann (2010) analyze the effect of competition between 
public and private schools in Europe on the propensity to become entrepreneurs among 
students aged 15. Competition is measured by the proportion of students enrolled in private 
schools. As this variable is likely to be endogenous, it is instrumented by the proportion of 
Catholics at the end of the Nineteen Century in the countries where Catholicism was not the 
state  religion.  At  that  time  the  state  monopoly  on  education  was  strongly  opposed  by 
Catholics,  who  promoted  private  confessional  schools.  The  authors  find  that  school 
competition  favors  entrepreneurship  and  that  competition  is  higher  among  Central  and 
Northern  Europe  countries  where  Catholicism  was  not  a  state  religion  but  where  large 
Catholic communities resided. The authors do not focus on the ethical content of alternative 
religious denominations, but rather argue that the school competition emerged  from the 
struggle between laic and confessional education favored entrepreneurship.   8 
 
In what follows we take a different perspective, mainly driving our attention to the cultural 
differences between Protestantism and Catholicism, and their effect on entrepreneurship.  
3. Research Design 
 
Cultural  background  is  hard  to  define  and  measure,  and  sometimes  it  is  arduous  to 
disentangle cultural elements from correlated third factors simultaneously shaping individual 
attitudes or the environment where individuals act. For instance, Becker and Woessmann 
(2009) argue that Protestantism, thanks to its emphasis on the personal reading of the Bible, 
encouraged education since reformation. According to this view, it is education and not the 
protestant ethic, like in Weber’s theory, which created the humus  for the higher prosperity 
of reformed areas in Germany in the late 1800s. Their view is therefore alternative to Max 
Weber’s theory of a direct role of Protestant ethic in explaining the development of early 
capitalism or more generally economic progress in Germany.  
In what follows, we do not investigate whether religion denomination has a general effect on 
economic prosperity, but we rather focus on a specific dimension of economic activity, i.e. 
entrepreneurship, which is left aside  from Becker and Woessmann’s analysis but can be 
associated with Weber’s thesis. Our aim is to test whether the social norms attached to a 
Protestant  versus  Catholic  background  affect  the  individual  choice  of  becoming  an 
entrepreneur in a modern economy, controlling  for individual educational attainment. In 
principle, this could provide a  further test of an education-based versus an ethics-based 
effect of Protestantism on economic outcomes. However, we should keep in mind that one 
does not exclude the other. In other words, Weber’s theory may  fail to identify the major 
driving  force behind the early development of capitalism, but still give us some indications 
on how culture affect economic choices in a mature market economy. 
In order to investigate the existence of a causal relationship between the cultural elements 
embodied by religion and a specific outcome of interest, the identification strategy should 
deal  with  the  confounding  factors  that  may  corrupt  our  interpretation  of  the  empirical 
evidence. Europe is an ideal setting to construct such an analysis, being characterized by well 
established regional religious traditions, mostly related to Christianity but that still differ in a 9 
 
number of ways as regards basic ethical principles and prescriptions.  Protestantism and 
Catholicism are indeed distinct confessions of the same religion, Christianity, and they share 
a large part of their beliefs and values, while differing only with respect to certain peculiar 
cultural  aspects  that  we  aim  at  capturing  through  our  empirical  modelling.  In  addition, 
European  Catholics  and  Protestants  operate  in  similar  economic  contexts,  they  share  a 
similar access to education, which is guaranteed regardless of individual religion, and share 
similar languages (in same cases identical, such as in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK) 
and other cultural dimensions. There is no negative discrimination on the labor market that 
could  lead  to  entrepreneurship  as  a  sort  of  obliged  way  (Clark  and  Drinkwater,  2000). 
Therefore Protestants and Catholics are on average homogenous in terms of what matters to 
entrepreneurship, except for their specific religious culture. 
A major issue, however, when dealing with the ethical and cultural content of religions is that 
self-identification with a certain religious creed does not necessarily imply internalization of 
religious ethical principles. This is the reason why various religiousness intensity indicators 
have been used before in order to measure the different degree of attachment of individuals 
to  religious  cultural  beliefs  (McCleary  and  Barro,  2006).  Nevertheless,  most  of  these 
indicators, e.g.  frequency of attendance of religious services, weekly prayers, donation of 
money and time to religious organizations, are likely to be endogenous to labour market 
choices. We should instead use a religious intensity measure which is exogenous to our 
outcome of interest.  
We therefore develop a research strategy that aims at addressing the issues discussed above, 
focusing on the two main Christian denominations, i.e. Protestantism and Catholicism. Our 
identification strategy rests on  four pillars that attains, respectively, to: (1) how individuals 
choose to adhere to a certain religious denomination, (2) the rationale of the geographical 
distribution of religious denominations across European regions, (3) the degree of adherence 
to the norms and ethic embodied by a religious denomination and (4) possible confounding 
factors given pillars 1 to 3. 
As  regards  the  first  point,  we  think  about  religion  as  being  learnt  at  home,  i.e.  being 
transmitted from parents to sons. People can turn atheist when they are raised religious, but 10 
 
typically they do not switch  from their parents’ confession to a different confession, as 
confirmed  by  simple  data  inspection.  Therefore  we  can  assume  that  the  only  individual 
choice regarding religion is whether to be religious or atheist. When individuals decide to be 
religious, they adopt their parents’ confession.  
Second, the geographical distribution of religion in Europe is historically determined. The 
presence of Protestant and Catholic minorities closely follows the equilibrium found at the 
end of the religion wars of Sixteen and Seventeen Centuries. This distribution is persistent 
due to the inter-generational transmission of religion. Therefore, the current status of being 
part of a religious minority can be considered as exogenously given. 
Third, the  followers of religious minorities accept and internalize to a higher degree the 
ethical norms of their religion and the broader culture a religion carries on. This is because 
the clergy of a minority religion provides higher effort to maintain its followers and possibly 
attract new ones, and because of the willingness of minorities to defend their own identity. 
In general, being part of a minority is more costly and therefore it can only be justified if the 
attachment to a faith is stronger. Minorities are therefore composed of more orthodox and 
stricter believers than majorities.  
Fourth, the condition of being minority might carry out other characteristics or endowments 
than stricter adhesion to a religious culture. More specifically, minorities can enjoy stricter 
and  more  intense  social  networks  which  could  be  much  beneficial  to  entrepreneurship. 
Although this can be true, we show that the differential intensity of social networks of 
Catholic and Protestant minorities in Europe are alike.  
Under these conditions, the differential effect of Protestant culture versus Catholic culture 
on entrepreneurship can be identified by comparing the effects on the probability of being 
entrepreneur  when  part  of  a  Protestant  minority  with  that  of  being  part  of  a  Catholic 
minority. 
In what  follows we will  first discuss each of the assumptions upon which our research 
design rests, then we will present the empirical analysis based on the identification strategy 11 
 
described above. We will start by discussing the inheritance of religious denominations from 
parents. 
1.  Religion is inherited by parents  
Religion and religiosity are transmitted by parents to sons, generation after generation (Hoge 
et al., 1982; Clark and Worthington, 1987; Ozorak, 1989;  Hayes and Pittelkow, 1993; Bañas 
and Noemann, 2006). A rather large number of people turn atheist, especially in the last 
decades when we have assisted to an acceleration of the process of secularization in Europe, 
but very few people convert to another confession or religion.  
Looking at the data of the newly released ISSP Religion III survey collected in 2008, 96 
percent of respondents with two Catholic parents have been raised Catholic. This  figure is 
only  slightly  smaller  for  Protestants  (94  percent).  Of  those  raised  Catholic,  83  percent 
continue to  follow their denomination when adult, while 16 percent turn atheist and only 
about  1  percent  convert  to  Protestantism.  The  parallel  figures  for  Protestants  are  79 
percent,  20  percent  and  1  percent  respectively.  When  we  exclude  Eastern  European 
countries, where atheism was promoted by the Communist regimes, we find that 80 percent 
of Catholics and 79 percent of Protestants maintain the religion they were raised in and 19 
and 20 percent respectively convert to atheism. Overall, about 80 percent  follow parents’ 
confession with a slightly higher persistence among Catholics. These proportions change 
somewhat  among  minorities.  Among  Protestant  minorities,  66  percent  keep  parents’ 
religion, 26 percent turn atheists and 8 percent convert to Catholicism. Similar numbers are 
observed among Catholic minorities. Such higher erosion is partly explained by the fact that 
only about 50 percent of people belonging to a minority marry someone with the same 
religion, compared to more than 80% in the total population
4.    
Data show that conversion to another confessions is uncommon. Instead, as seen, many 
people become atheist, despite having being raised in a religious household. They are about 
4.95 years younger [c.i. 4.23 – 5.48], 11 percent [c.i. 9-13] more likely to be male, 13 percent 
                                                 
4 Similar patterns have been  found using both ISSP Religion 2 (1998) and ISSP Religion 1 (1991) data on 
subsamples of countries, except secularization being less pronounced.  12 
 
[c.i. 11-15] more likely to be employed and they have on average 1.30 additional years of 
education  [c.i.  1.16-1.44]
5.    On  the  other  hand,  conversion  from  atheism  to  either 
Catholicism or Protestantism is limited: 83 percent of those raised atheist continue to declare 
themselves atheists, 5 percent convert to Catholicism and 12 to Protestantism.    
 
2. Minorities are stable over the long run 
The  formation of Protestant and Catholic minorities in Europe is much related with the 
pattern of conversion to Lutheranism during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries in a 
population  uniformly  Catholic  for  at  least  eight  centuries.  At  mid  Seventeen  Century, 
Central Europe, under the flag of the Holy Roman Empire, was a patchwork of confessions, 
with Catholic enclaves surrounded by Protestant territories and vice versa. This pattern was 
the  outcome  of  a  weak  central  power.  The  number  of  fiefs  and  free  cities,  some 
comparatively large and same so small to include only one village, which composed the 
Empire at the time of the Augsburg Peace (1555) was 225. In most cases, even the largest 
were not territorially compact but much  fragmented because of the continuous marriages 
between prince  families. All were pursuing larger autonomy  from the Emperor. In this 
context, religion was not only a matter of spirituality but a weapon in the political arena 
between the emperor, the church and the nobles.     
Although formally banned with the Edict of Worms, Lutheranism continued to diffuse and 
many princes converted. In 1531 the Schmalkaldic League was created among the protestant 
territories as a mutual defense against the emperor. Although the League was defeated and 
dispersed in 1547, Lutheranism was legitimated in the Peace of Augsburg (1555). The rule 
“cuius regio eius religio” (whose realm, his religion) was established, which granted the rulers the 
right to decide the official and unique religion of their territories. Their subjects could either 
subscribe the choice or leave the territory with their possessions. This rule applied with two 
                                                 
5 t-test based across the sample of people coming from a household where both parents were religious, either 
Catholic or Protestant, who turn atheist and the sample of people with the same background who remains 
religious, controlling for country dummies.  13 
 
exceptions. In the ecclesiastical territories, the Prince-Bishops converted to Lutheranism had 
to  abandon  the  power  and  be  replaced  by  a  Catholic.  Their  subjects  could  continue  to 
practice their  faith, either Catholic or Lutheran (Reservatum Ecclesiasticum). At the same time 
the  Declaratio  Ferdinandei  exempted  some  of  the  cities  from  the  requirement  of  religious 
uniformity, if the reformed religion had been practiced there since the mid 1520s, allowing 
for a few mixed cities and towns where Catholics and Lutherans lived together. 
The result of these rules coupled with the Empire  fragmentation was a rather dispersed 
geographical  distribution  of  Protestantism  and  Catholicism  in  Central  Europe
6.  In  the 
Northern  territories  Protestantism  was  dominating  with  the  notable  exceptions  of  large 
ecclesiastical fiefs, such as the Bishoprics of Munster and Wurzburg and the Archbishoprics 
of Magdenburg and Tier besides the several  free cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck. 
The South was predominantly Catholic, with the traditionally Catholic Bavaria and Austria, 
but  with  several  free  cities  such  as  Augsburg,  Ulm  and  Krepten  largely  or  significantly 
protestant.    The  same  Wurttemberg  (the  second  larger  southern  fief)  joined  the 
Schmalkaldic League before being restored to Catholicism. 
Essentially  the  same  religious  pattern  emerged  four  centuries  ago  is  present  in  Central 
Europe  nowadays.  This  is  apparent  comparing  Figure  1  and  2.  In  the  former  we  have 
reported  the  map  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  after  the  Westphalia  Treaty  (1648), 
highlighting the Habsburg domains, Bavaria, and the Ecclesiastic possessions, that is the 
areas with a massive Catholic presence. In the latter we represent the same area nowadays 
with the proportion of Catholics in each region. The two matches to a large extent. For 
instance the regions bordering with the Netherlands, covered by the important Bishopric of 
Munster show a significant Catholic population still today, although the Netherlands and the 
remaining Northern Germany are traditionally Protestant.   
                                                 
6 Religion wars continued in Europe  for almost hundred years. The peace of Westphalia (1648) which ended 
the Thirty Years war confirmed the religious situation emerged one century before with the Peace of 
Augsburg. Furthermore, it made the imperial power more symbolic than real, wiping out its chances of 
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These  patterns  are  confirmed  by  Spenkuch  (2011)  who  recently  collected  historical 
information about the prevalent religion in 1555 and 1624 in each of the modern German 
counties. Past prevalent religion has been determined by taking into account the size of the 
fiefs included within the borders of the current counties (detailed information on population 
being unavailable). The religion of each fief is that of its ruler, which legally determined also 
the religion of the subjects due to the “cuius regio eius religio” principle. Comparing the 
geographical distribution of confessions in 1624 with today’s distribution, it emerges that the 
two largely overlap. Moreover, by using German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) microdata, 
the  author  finds  that  the  probability  of  an  individual  reporting  to  be  protestant  today 
(compared to Catholic or Atheist) is significantly higher in counties that were prevalently 
protestant in 1624.  
We  complement  Spenkuch’s  analysis  in  two  ways.  First  we  compare  the  proportion  of 
historically protestant counties
7 in each of the modern German landers (our geographical 
unit of analysis  for Germany) with the proportion of Protestant  fellows today, taking into 
account only religious people to be consistent with the historical data. The correlation is as 
high as 0.87 when we focus only to the landers of the former Federal Republic of Germany 
and as high as 0.90 when we consider all German landers
8.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Secondly, we do not consider landers, which are a relative recent administrative unit, but we 
look  at  German  Catholic  dioceses  whose  boundaries  in  many  cases  almost  perfectly 
                                                 
7 We rely on Spenkuch (2011) dataset and account mixed counties (i.e. without a prevalent religion) both to the 
set of Protestant and to the set of Catholic counties with a weight equal to 1/2. 
8 However, in the East,  fifty years of communist regime, less than 30 percent of the people report to be 
religious.   15 
 
reproduce  those  of  the  antic  bishoprics,  such  as  in  the  case  of  the  dioceses  of  Mainz, 
Munster, Wurzburg. There are 27 Catholic dioceses in today’s Germany compared to 16 
Landers and more than 400 counties. Indeed, on the one hand dioceses are disaggregated 
enough to generate a good amount of variability and on the other hand, given their size, their 
religious composition will not be significantly altered by the physiological mobility of the 
residents at a more disaggregated geographical level. As a  further advantage it is relatively 
simple to associate to each diocese the corresponding  fiefs at the time of the Thirty Years 
War and gauge their relative importance. In Table 1  for each Catholic diocese we have 
reported the proportion of Catholics nowadays, the most important Catholic and Protestant 
territories  in  1618  totally  or  partially  included  in  the  current  diocese  borders  and  an 
evaluation of the relative importance of the protestant territories compared to the catholic, 
based on their relative size. We find that the correlation between the proportion of Catholic 
residents nowadays and the historically relevance of Protestantism (measured over a  five 
steps scale, where 1 is highest importance) is as high as 94 percent.  
Outside Germany, persistence of religious distribution is even more apparent in Switzerland 
and the Netherlands. For instance, in Switzerland the modern cantons of Berne, Neuchatel, 
Vaud are today predominantly protestant as their territories were in the aftermath of the 
Reform. Furthermore, they enclose the canton of Fribourg which is largely Catholic today as 
it was  five centuries ago with its episcopal see. The canton of Grisons is religiously mixed 
today following the tradition of “religious parity” of the Federation of the Three Leagues. In 
current Netherlands, the southern provinces of North Brabant (partly) and Limburg were 
included in the Spanish Netherlands and today maintain the traditional Catholic confession. 
In the eastern provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel there are Catholic minorities in the 
territories at the border with the German Archbishopric of Munster. 
Although  we  do  not  detail  religious  distribution  and  its  historical  evolution  for  each 
European  country,  these  results  indicate  that  religious  geographical  distribution  is  very 
persistent over time. Actually the proportion of Catholics and Protestants over the total of 
the  religious  people  tend  to  remain  stable  over  time  whatever  the  geographical  or 
administrative  unit  we  consider,  meaning  that  both  majorities  and  minorities  tend  to 
replicate themselves. This historical persistence support our claim that, to religious people, 16 
 
the  condition  of  being  part  of  a  minority  or  of  a  majority  is  by  and  large  exogenously 
determined. 
 
3. Minorities are more adherent to ethical norms 
Although minorities suffer from a certain erosion, it has been suggested in the literature that 
members of minority religions are the perfect believers, because they are more religious and 
more observant of the ethical norms compared to the  followers of the same religion when 
they are majority. This may be true  for at least two reasons. First because ministers of a 
minority religion work harder to defend its identity against the competition of other religions 
(market-share hypothesis, Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone 1995; Finke and Stark 1998; Stark 
1997). Second, because religion is an important  factor of people identity, beside language, 
history and culture, and it is considered by its followers a value to be preserved against the 
influence of the majority (Bisin and Verdier, 2000 and Bisin et al, 2004).  
According to this view, the religious culture is better observed in minorities, while it is rather 
diluted and contaminated in majorities.  
To illustrate this  fundamental point of our identification strategy we will initially present a 
simple  analytical  model  that  describes  both  the  choice  of  following  parents’  confession 
versus turning atheists and the degree of adhesion to religion. Next we will provide several 
pieces of supporting empirical evidence. 
Analytical model. 
Suppose that each individual inherits  from parents a certain degree of adhesion to parents' 
confession  ] , 0 [ max 0 α α ∈  and resides in a region where the proportion of residents sharing 
his same confession is  ]. 1 , 0 ( ∈ S   
The  degree  of  adhesion  physiologically  reduces  over  time  if  not  actively  cultivated. 
Furthermore  we  suppose  that  the  inherited  0 α   depreciates  more  when  the  size  of  the 
community of believers  S  is small, such as it is the case among minorities, because of the 17 
 
incessant influence of the surrounding larger religious communities. Accordingly, let  ) (S δ
be the depreciation factor and assume  0 ) ( ' > S δ .  
People can counter depreciation and even increase their degree of adhesion by investing time 
and  resources  in  religion.  Define   I S A 0 0 ) ( πα δ α + = the  degree  of  adhesion  after  the 
investment  I has been made. Marginal returns of investment  0 πα are higher for individuals 
with high inherited  0 α because they have already been exposed to the particular confession's 
culture. Investment is costly and let its cost be  cI C = .  
Individuals value “identity” and tend to preserve it. Adhesion to parents' religion is part of 
individual identity. To maximize their utility, individuals decide whether to  follow parents’ 
religion or turn atheists, and the level of investment in religion. We neglect the possibility of 
turning to another confession as this is uncommon in practice. 
Let people utility if they decide to keep parents religion be  
cI S g I S C S g A U









) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( 0 0 πα δ α       (1) 
where  ) (S g  is a decreasing function of  S which aims at capturing the fact that preserving 
identity is more salient in small communities. An alternative interpretation of  ) (S g is that 
the clergy is more effective in reinforcing people adhesion in small communities of believers.  
For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the utility from the option of turning atheists to  
U U
A =           (2) 
 
i.e. a level independent of the size of the community.  
Preliminary individuals determine which level of investment in adhesion is optimal and next 
they compare the (maximum) utility their derive from being religious or atheist. 
The first order condition of (1) yields  
π








∗           (3) 
so that, ceteris paribus, optimal investment is higher if inherited adhesion is higher and if the 
size of the community is small, given that  ) (S g  is decreasing and  ) (S δ  is increasing. The 
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Indeed, the degree of adhesion will be higher in smaller communities. 












∗         (5) 
Now, individuals decides to keep parents’ religion when  
A R U U >
∗           (6) 














α         (7) 
We impose the following parameter restriction  
S
c
U   all   0 > − δ
π
          (8) 
to avoid that (7) is trivially satisfied. 
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1           (10) 
As  ( ) 0 1 < − δ
π
c
U ,  given  condition  (8),  inequality  (10)  is  satisfied  if  the  function  ) (S δ   is 
sufficiently steep, i.e. if depreciation increase fast enough as long as the size of the religious 
community decreases.  
In this case we can represent individual choice as in the following picture: 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The  inherited  degree  of  adhesion  lays  on  the  vertical  axes  and  the  size  of  individual’s 
religious  community  on  the  horizontal  axis.  The  downward  sloping  locus  represent  the 19 
 
frontier of inequality (7). For all pairs (S,α0) located above the frontier, individuals prefer to 
keep and cultivate parents religion. Their degree of adhesion is given by expression (4). 
Conversely for the pairs (S,α0) below the frontier, individuals turn to atheism.    
The  pattern  that  emerges  is  characterized  by  two  features.  First,  individuals  with  high 
inherited adhesion  0 α  are over-represented among small communities while there is much 
more  heterogeneity  among  large  communities.  Second,  among  small  communities 
investment in religion as well as the degree of adhesion is higher, for any given  . 0 α   
 
Empirical Evidence 
To test the strength of the correlation between adhesion and market share of a religion, we 
use again ISSP Religion III data. We look at nine possible outcomes, three related to the 
intensity of religiosity,  five to articles of  faith and one about confidence in churches and 
religious organizations. The  first three are the average number of times an individual prays 
per  week
9,  whether  an  individual  prays  regularly
10,  and  a  self-assessment  of  his/her 
religiosity, measured by a dummy which takes 1 when he reports to be “extremely, very or 
somewhat  religious”  and  0  when  reports  from  “neither  religious  nor  not  religious”  to 
“extremely not religious”.
11 Regarding articles of  faith, we consider initially two of them 
which point to the specificities of Protestantism and Catholicism.  People are asked whether 
they agree (on a scale  from 1 to 5) with the statement “I have my own way of connecting 
with God without churches or religious services”. Personal and unmediated relation with 
                                                 
9 Praying should depend mainly on individual religiosity and only marginally on the “supply” of churches and 
priests, opposed to attendance to religious services.  
10 Defined as at least once per month. 
11 Although religiosity not necessary implies adhesion to given religious culture and norms, typically more 
religious people are also stricter observant. One reason behind this correlation is the action of the priests 
which transmit both religious norms and the need to actively profess own  faith.  Given this correlation, 
religiosity  has  been  often  preferred  to  religion  denomination  to  measure  the  degree  of  attachment  of 
individuals to religious cultural beliefs (McCleary and Barro, 2006).  20 
 
God is one tenet of the Protestant confession, which acknowledges a minor role to the 
clergy and the religious institution compared to the Catholic confession. Next, respondents 
express their agreement on the statement “There is little that people can do to change the 
course of their lives”. This question is related to another point of differentiation between the 
two confessions, i.e. predestination. On the one hand Catholicism states that salvation can 
be obtained and deserved by means of the good works. On the other hand Protestantism 
indicates that salvation is a God’s grace and that good works only signal individual fate but 
cannot alter it. We derive two dummies taking one when the individual strongly agrees or 
agrees  and  zero  otherwise.  The  following  three  articles  of  faith  are  common  to  both 
confessions and regard beliefs in life after death, in heaven and in hell. We coded them as 
dummies which take 1 if individuals answer “yes, definitely” or “yes, probably” and zero if 
they  answer  “No,  probably  not”  or  “No,  definitely  not”.  Finally,  the  last  outcome  is 
confidence in churches and other religious organizations, which is coded 1 is respondents 
report complete or a great deal of confidence and zero from some to not at all confidence. 
The estimated empirical equation is  
      (11) 
over the restricted sample of those declaring to be Catholic or Protestant
12. The alternative 
outcomes   of individual i living in region r (defined at NUTS 2 whenever possible
13) of 
country  c  are  regressed  over  individual  confession,  captured  by  the  dummy  P  (1  is  for 
                                                 
12 We exclude individuals belonging to the  following religious denominations: Christian Orthodox, Jewish, 
Muslim, Eastern Religions, other denominations. 
13 In ISSP data regions are defined at a level of geographical disaggregation which ranges from an equivalent 
of NUTS1 to NUTS3 (sometimes imperfect) and in few cases it has no clear correspondence with the standard 
classification (e.g.  for Denmark). We have estimated the model by defining regions as geographical entities 
aggregated at least at level NUTS2, the most common level in the data. Furthermore, to reduce measurement 
errors due to sampling, we have retained only regions with more than 30 observations.   
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Protestantism), and two interactions, mP and mC which take on 1 when the individual’s 
confession  (resp.  Protestant  and  Catholic)  is  minority  in  his  region  of  residence.  Next 
gender, age, years of education, employment condition, urban or rural residence, generally 
denoted by X, are included as controls, as well as regional (at NUTS 1)  fixed effects   
which capture regional characteristics common to all residents irrespectively of their  faith. 
Coefficients  and    identify  the  differential  effect  of  minorities  compared  to  the 
remaining population of the same faith. This is a model somewhat similar to that estimated 
in Gruber (2005). 
We  have  tried  alternative  definitions  of  minority  and  remarkably  results  do  not  change 
qualitatively  across  definitions
14.  Indeed  the  geographical  distribution  of  minorities  and 
majorities  in  Europe  follows  a  clear  geographical  pattern  which  is  robust  to  alternative 
sensible definitions of what a minority and a majority are. For sake of brevity, we report only 
estimates based on the following definition:  
Definition 1 (Minority): confession dir of an individual i residing in region r is considered 
minority if a) its market-share in region r is less than 25%; and b) the market-share of dir is 
the smallest in region r
15.  
Thanks to the richness of ISSP data regarding religious  family background, market shares 
are defined, in this section only, not on respondents’ religion but on the religion of their 
parents. This allows to better identify the long term religious distribution in the regions, 
avoiding the fluctuations connected with the recent secularization
16. 
                                                 
14 See the appendix B for further discussion. 
15 This is the most stringent among the definitions we have tried. In ISSP data only about 3 percent of the 
sampled Protestants reside in regions where they are minority; the corresponding  figure  for Catholics is 
slightly more than 1 percent. These percentages would increase to about 8 and 4 percent respectively if we 
removed requirement b) from Definition 1 
16 In practice, there is no significant difference in our results when market shares are defined on the basis of the 
respondent’s religious denomination. 
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Estimates are reported in Table 2  for each outcome. As expected, religious minorities tend 
to  pray  more  and  more  regularly,  are  more  religious  than  their  “non-minority” 
counterparts
17. This results contrasts with Gruber (2005)’s, where a positive relation has been 
found in the US between attendance to religious services and the share of residents sharing 
the same confession, in spite of the similar specification of the model.  
Turning to the articles of faith, minority Protestants tend to agree more with the principle of 
a  direct  and  unmediated  relationship  with  God,  compared  to  other  Protestant. 
Symmetrically, minority Catholics believe more than other Catholics that salvation can be 
achieved by means of good works and that individuals’ fate is not predetermined. Turning to 
common articles of faith we find that the minorities of both confessions are more likely to 
believe to the life after death, heaven and hell. Finally both minorities tend to have more 
confidence in churches, and unsurprisingly more so among minority Catholics.  
Although religious norms and article of  faith are only a part of the broader collection of 
ethical, cultural and social norms that a religion is likely to convey as a religious culture, it is 
reasonable to think that adhesion to religious and other kind of norms are correlated, and 
that stronger adhesion to religious norm signal stronger adhesion to a broader religious 
culture. 
 
4. A possible confounder: social networks 
Unfortunately  the  condition  of  being  minority  brings  about  also  stronger  networks  and 
social  capital,  which  could  favor  entrepreneurship.  Social  networks  tend  to  be  stronger 
among  minorities  because  cooperation  is  easier  to  achieve  among  smaller  communities 
which share similar values and cultural traits (McPherson et al. 2001). Indeed we observe 
                                                 
17 The estimate p-value associated to the parameter of “minority Catholic” in column (3) is 0.059. 23 
 
that minority religions are typically over-represented among the entrepreneurs as suggested 
by the so called “middle-man theory” (Bonacich , 1973): either minorities act as mediators 
between  other  social  groups,  or  minorities  express  a  strong  demand  for  mediation. 
Historically, the Jews have developed commercial and  financial networks resting on the 
small communities scattered among European cities (Botticini and Eckstein, 2005). In this 
case it is not the Jewish religion alone which favored entrepreneurship, but also the peculiar 
conditions that such religion are likely to have  favored, such as close connection and trust 
among  its  fellows  (Dana,  2006).  Moreover,  Dana  (2009)  reviews  several  examples  of 
financial, employment and information networks that emerge between people of the same 
religion. Ellison et al. (2009) and the references therein, suggest that small congregations 
provide their members with support and protection in case of shocks, much more than large 
communities.   
Thus  a  stronger  social  connection  could  be  the  key  to  successful  entrepreneurship.  In 
Appendix A we explore whether this is the case in Europe with Catholic and Protestant 
minorities
18, by using data collected in the ISSP survey on Social Networks II produced in 
2001 and estimating equation (11) on a battery of social network indicators. These are: the 
number of close  friends on the workplace, in the neighborhood and in clubs, church and 
other  associations;  participation  to  voluntary  associations;  whether  the  respondent  can 
potentially borrow large amounts  from relatives and  friends; whether the respondent has 
actually lent money to relatives and  friends; whether he heard about his current work  for 
relatives  and  friends;  whether  he  helped  someone  outside  of  his/her  house-hold  with 
housework or shopping; whether he helped someone or to  find a job; whether there are 
many people the respondent trusts completely; and whether he thinks that the others will 
take advantage of him if they had the opportunity.   
We  find absolutely no evidence of a systematic difference between minorities in terms of 
social connection. Actually, we have also found no difference between minorities and “non-
minorities”, a fact that confirms the absence of religious discrimination in modern Europe. 
                                                 
18 We focus on the set of European countries excluding those with Christian Orthodox majorities. 24 
 
These results are reassuring about the ability of our research design to identify the effects of 
religious culture on economic outcomes. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
 
 
We aim at estimating the differential effect of Protestantism (compared to Catholicism) on 
the  propensity  to  become  an  entrepreneur.  Consider  the  diagram  in  Figure  4.  The 
propensity to entrepreneurship is displayed on the vertical axis and the degree of adhesion to 
a religious culture lays on the horizontal axis. The degree of adhesion is a latent variable 
which we do not observe directly. Rather, we observe the market share of each confession 
which is correlated with the degree of adhesion, as we have discussed in section 3.3. Yet, the 
precise relation between adhesion and market share is unknown and likely to be non-linear. 
Rather  than  assuming  a  particular  functional  form  for  this  relationship
19  and  risking  a 
misspecification, we opt  for a less direct approach which only looks at the “boundary” 
conditions of majorities and minorities and makes use of the fact that the average adhesion 
among majorities is significantly lower than the average adhesion among minorities. 
In the diagram, when the degree of adhesion is zero, the propensity to self-employment is 
unaffected  by  the  religious  culture  and  fully  depends  on  other  factors,  whatever  the 
confession. In this case, the reported confession is merely a label which does not carry out 
any specific content and has no consequence on entrepreneurship. This is our key model 
specification hypothesis and we refer to it as the “common intercept hypothesis”.   
As far as the degree of adhesion increases, both confessions influence the propensity to self-
employment, possibly in a specific way
20. The situation of complete adhesion is ideally the 
                                                 
19 The most natural (but likely not the best fitting) would be a linear mapping between degree of adhesion and 
the market share of each confession. 
20 In the diagram we have represented the map between adhesion and propensity to entrepreneurship as linear 
for the sake of simplicity. However, in principle, it could also be non-linear..  25 
 
one we would like to observe in order to estimate the impact of a religious culture. Yet, as 
for the case of zero adhesion, complete adhesion is unobservable. We then approach the 
situations of zero and complete adhesion by looking respectively at the believers who belong 
to majority and minority confessions.    
Minorities are defined as in Definition 1. Majorities are defined symmetrically as follows: 
Definition 2 (Majority): confession dir of an individual i residing in region r is considered 
majority if a) its market-share in region r is larger than 60%; and b) the market-share of dir is 
the largest in region r.   
Being relatively close to the intercept, we expect that the differential effect of Protestantism 
versus Catholicism between majorities will be small. Conversely, if any differential effect 
existed, it should be  fully apparent between minorities as their members closely  follow the 
norms and the values of their confession
21.  
    
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
We estimate a modified version of equation (11) maintaining the  focus only on religious 
individuals
22.  Differently  from  equation  (11)  the  model  explicitly  accounts  for  the 
differential effects of both minorities  and majorities. Formally, the equation we estimate is 
       
                                  (12) 
                                                 
21 Note that, given the hypothesis of common intercept, the latter difference (approximately) captures the full 
differential effect of Protestantism compared to Catholicism that we would observe in the case of complete 
adhesion. 
22 Atheists have been left aside because they possibly differ  from religious individuals in some key respects, 
such as risk aversion, as we will discuss in Section 7.5 and Appendix C below. 
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where Yirc indicates whether individual i living in region r of country c is self-employed, Pirc is 
a dummy which takes one  for individuals declaring themselves to be protestant, Mirc is a 
dummy which takes one whether individual i is part of a religious majority and mirc is another 
dummy which indicates whether individual i is part of a religious minority. MircPirc and mircPirc 
are interactions between the majority/minority dummies and the protestant dummy, Xirc are 
individual level controls, Wrc are regional level controls, µc are country fixed effects and εirc is 
an IID error term
23. 
From model (12) we can both derive the differential impact of Protestantism and test the 
common intercept hypothesis. The differential impact of the Protestant culture D is defined 
as the simple difference 
 
                      (13) 
which turns to be equal to   in terms of the estimated parameters. 
By  taking  differences,  the  differential  effect  of  Protestantism  is  purified  of  common 
confounders such as a possible higher intensity of social connections among minorities. 
The specification test of common intercept is provided by another simple difference now 
taken between majorities, which is close to the situation of zero adhesion.   
(14)
 
The specification test passes if condition (a)   (i.e.  ) is satisfied, and, 
if the stronger condition (b)   cannot be rejected.
 Without explicitly requiring 
condition (b), we could not invoke a continuity-based argument to claim that the hypothesis 
                                                 
23 A variant of model (12) includes regional  fixed effects defined at NUTS 1, a broader level of geographical 
aggregation than the one used to define minorities and majorities, see below.  
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of common intercept holds. If (b)  failed, we could be in a case where Protestants differ 
from Catholics even at zero adhesion, a puzzling situation that would suggests either that the 
model is ill-specified or that we omit to control for important confounders. 
5. Data  
 
Our sample consists of European Social Survey (ESS) data collected every two years  from 
2002  to  2008  in  a  number  of  Western  and  Eastern  European  countries.  We  select  all 
countries where Orthodox religion is not majority and exclude all non-Christian religious 
minorities, ending up with 22 countries, 148,234 individuals in the sample, of which 78,889 
are active in the labour market. The countries selected in our sample include the major 
Western-European  and  a  number  of  Eastern-European  whose  religious  tradition  is  not 
Orthodox.  They  are  Austria,  Belgium,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Czech-Republic,  Netherlands, 
Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Poland, Finland, Portugal, France, Slovakia, Germany, Slovenia, 
Spain, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, United Kingdom. Table B1 in the Appendix 
shows the participation of each country to each wave of the ESS.  
European regions are defined according to the population dimension. The ESS data provide 
different levels of regional aggregation,  from NUTS 1 to NUTS 3, the latter only available 
for some selected countries. We define minorities and majorities at the most disaggregate 




FIGURES 5, 6, 7 AROUND HERE 
 
Table  3  displays  the  proportion  of  the  three  religious  denominations  in  each  country 
included in the sample, while figures 5 to 7 display the proportion of, respectively, Catholics, 
Protestants  and  atheists  across  European  regions  (NUTS  2).  Atheists  represent  43%  of 
                                                 
24 See appendix B for a broader discussion on this point.  28 
 
individuals in our sample while Catholics and Protestants are, respectively, 39% and 18% of 
the total. Figure 8 and 9 report the proportion of Protestant and Catholic minorities across 
European regions. 
 
FIGURES 8, 9 AROUND HERE 
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
The  first column in Table 4 and Figure 10 show instead the proportion of the surveyed 
individuals  who  are  self-employed,  while  the  second  and  third  columns  of  Table  4  and 
Figure 11 provide more detailed information on the characteristics of the surveyed self-
employed  in  terms  of  dependent  employees,  if  any.  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  France, 
Hungary,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia  are  the  countries  with  the  smallest  proportion  of  self-
employed. Predominantly Catholic countries, such as Italy, Poland, Spain and Portugal, are 
instead  the  countries  with  the  largest  proportion  of  self-employed  individuals  over  total 
employment. Of course, such simple correlation is not very informative since it is driven by 
all  sort  of  country-specific  unobservable  factors  that  affect  both  religion  and 
entrepreneurship. Looking at various definition of self-employment, i.e. self-employed with, 
respectively,  at  least  one  and  ten  dependent  employees,  we  see  how  the  extent  of  the 
entrepreneurship phenomenon is variously declined in terms of business dimension. Indeed, 
the proportion of entrepreneurs with many employees is quite diverse across countries. 
 FIGURES 10, 11 AROUND HERE 
We  estimate  model  (12)  adopting  a  linear  probability  model  specification,  clustering 
individual standard errors across European regions. Individual controls include age, gender, 
if  foreigner, years of schooling, marital status and a wealth variable indicating whether the 
main source of income is financial. In addition we can exploit one of the specificities of ESS 
data, i.e. the availability of information on entrepreneurial  family background, i.e. whether 
the father was self-employed. Family background is of particular relevance since we are able 
to distinguish between individuals who inherited a business (or a propensity to be self-
employed)  from those who were not expose to such advantage. In addition, we include a 29 
 
full set of area (country or regional) and time fixed effects, in order to control for country 
(or region) unobservable characteristics, and common cyclical factors. In some specifications 
we include time varying regional controls. These include regional GDP growth, population 
density,  unemployment  rate,  number  of  doctors  per  capita  as  a  proxy  for  social 
development, educational attainment at regional level and the extension of motorways as a 
proxy for infrastructures (source: Eurostat). Summary statistics are reported in Table B2 in 
the appendix.   
6. Results 
Column 1 in Table 5A displays our estimated baseline model, resulting  from specification 
(12). According to our estimates, adhesion to Protestantism induces a higher propensity of 
being  self-employed  with  respect  to  Catholicism.  More  specifically,  our  baseline  model 
points to a statistically significant increase in the propensity of being self-employed equal to 
3.3 percentage points if minority Protestant compared to a minority Catholic. This is the 
differential effect D we discussed in Section 4, i.e. the estimated difference in the propensity 
of being an entrepreneur when truly adhering to Protestantism versus Catholicism, which is 
displayed in the lower part of Table 5A and is indicated as “MinP-MinC”. The effect is 
sizable considering that the average likelihood of being an entrepreneur in Europe is about 
10 percent. 
 
TABLE 5A AROUND HERE 
 
As indicated by the model estimated in column 2, this result is robust to the exclusion of 
potential  endogenous  variables  such  as  education,  marital  status  and  whether  the  main 
source  of  wealth  is  financial  that  could  in  principle  confound  the  interpretation  of  our 
results within our research design’s setting. The estimated effect is indeed almost identical 
when dropping potentially endogenous controls. Similarly, we find identical results when we 
control for the characteristics of the regions used for calculating religious minority patterns 30 
 
across Europe. The model in column 3 includes the time varying regional macroeconomic 
controls discussed above with almost identical findings. 
For each of these models the identification assumptions of our empirical strategy have been 
tested. The parameter associated to MP (majority protestant) is always smaller than that 
associated to mP (minority protestant) as expected. Furthermore we checked whether there 
exists a significant effect of being a Protestant in Protestant majority regions versus being a 
Catholic in Catholic majority regions. The quantity “MajP-MajC” in the lower part of Panel 
A in Table 5 is the corresponding differential effect TEST introduced in Section 4. We 
always  fail  to  reject  that  MajP-MajC  is  equal  to  zero  in  any  of  the  specifications  and 
therefore our common intercept hypothesis is never rejected by the data. All combined 
results  indicate  that  the  effect  of  the  cultural  determinants  embodied  by  religious 
denominations have a significant impact on individual choices when the adhesion to religion 
is strong, as it is among minorities. Instead the effect is absent when the adhesion is less 
strong, as it is among majorities.  
Our results are tested in Table 5 Panel B against a number of robustness checks
25. In column 
1 the differential effect of Protestantism is robust to the inclusion of NUTS1 regional fixed 
effects instead of country fixed effects, thereby controlling for unobservable factors at a less 
aggregated geographical level. Here the effect of interest is almost identical to what found in 
the baseline model. Our results also holds when we only consider regions where respondents 
of both religious denomination are represented in the sample, as in column 2. In this case 
the number of observations drop by almost 2600 units with no appreciable effect on our 
estimated effect. In column 3 minorities are calculated at a NUTS 1 regional level in order to 
get  an  homogeneous  regional  disaggregation  level  across  countries.  This  means  that 
whenever ESS provides information on respondents’ region of residence at NUTS 2 and 3 
level, we aggregate at NUTS 1, and calculate whether and which religious denomination is 
minority. Similarly, in column 4 minorities are calculated at NUTS 2 level. In these cases the 
estimated effect is only slightly larger than previous columns (in both cases 3.6 percentage 
points instead of 3.3 percentage points).  
                                                 
25 See also the additional discussion and further robustness checks of section 7 below. 31 
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Finally, column 5 displays our model estimated on individuals who are employed instead of 
just active. Around 5% of individuals in our baseline sample are unemployed. Since we know 
their occupation and employment status (if any) during their last occupation, and since we 
are interested in the causal effect of cultural determinants on labour market choices we do 
not have any reason not to include respondents who are unemployed at the moment of their 
interview. However, in principle, these individuals may be characterized by peculiarities that 
do not make them necessarily homogeneous to the rest of our sample. Nevertheless, when 
we exclude unemployed respondents in column 3, our point estimates does not change, 
confirming our intuition. 
As regards the typical effects of controls, the likelihood to be self-employed increases by 
around 13 percentage points if father was self-employed, 9 percentage points if male and 10 
percentage points if main source of income is financial. Being foreigner is not significantly 
different than being national, and the effect of education is mixed.  
We have also estimated model (12) by using ISSP Religion I and II data, which cover the 
decade before the one we have analyzed so far. The first obvious interest in this exercise is 
that  of  testing  the  robustness  of  our  results  in  a  different  time  period.  The  second 
motivation  is  the  presence  in  ISSP  of  very  detailed  information  on  parents’  religion. 
Religious family background is a rather accurate measure of the cultural environment of the 
family where the respondent has grown up. Nevertheless, ISSP has also two drawbacks: it 
does not include information on parents’ entrepreneurship, and minority definitions can 
become too restrictive, because of the smaller sample size compared to ESS. We have then 
estimated model (12) replacing entrepreneurial with religious  family background. Overall 
results  remain  qualitatively  similar,  although  not  always  precisely  estimated.  There  is  a 
tendency to have larger effects of protestant ethics compared to what we obtained by using 
ESS,  most  likely  due  to  the  omission  of  the  highly  relevant  entrepreneurial  family 32 
 
background. Using ISSP, we have also considered the confession the respondent was raised 
in rather than his current religious denomination and we have defined regional market shares 
accordingly. In so doing we should capture the cultural background each individual has been 
exposed to during childhood and which is not observed by looking at current denomination. 
Results  remain  stable,  as  one  could  predict  given  our  earlier  results  suggesting  that 
transitions  between  confessions  are  small.  This  also  suggests  that  current  religious 
denomination is an acceptable indicator of religious cultural background. 
7. Discussion and Further Robustness Checks 
 
7.1 Geographical Patterns of Protestantism and Catholicism in Europe 
 
Our estimates indicate that the likelihood of being an entrepreneur is about 3 percentage 
point larger among individuals endowed with a Protestant religious cultural background with 
respect to individuals characterized by a Catholic religious background, ceteris paribus. This 
is a sizeable difference as the average likelihood of being an entrepreneur in Europe is about 
10 percent. The finding is remarkably stable and passes a series of robustness checks.  
However, a number of issues need to be further investigated in order to correctly interpret 
our  findings. The  first issue has to do with the peculiar distribution of minorities across 
European regions. In principle we cannot exclude that, despite originating from exogenous 
historical factors, the concentration of minorities in peculiar geographical areas for reasons 
not directly related to religion may in some way affect our  findings. Looking at Table 3, 
Europe is characterized by two macro-regions with a strong concentration of confessions, 
i.e. Scandinavia and the Mediterranean area. Indeed, Scandinavian religious individuals are 
vastly Protestant and religious individuals in Mediterranean countries are vastly Catholic. The 
geographical distribution of minorities in Figures 8 and 9 is then partly the product of this 
peculiar  geographical  pattern  of  European  Protestantism  and  Catholicism.  Despite  the 
distribution of minorities being not so clear-cut across European regions, these two clusters 
in Protestantism and Catholicism may in principle be a reason  for concern. It could be 
possible that by comparing the behavior of individuals belonging to minorities across regions 33 
 
we may indeed be confounded by the structural characteristics of these specific European 
macro-regions  in  terms  of  institutions  and  general  economic  environment,  more  or  less 
conductive to entrepreneurship. In addition, if some macro-areas were traditionally more 
tolerant than other versus religious minorities, the ability of such minorities in establishing 
entrepreneurship patterns could be strengthened, but this would have nothing to do with the 
ethical  content  of  the  minority  religion.  This  particular  channel  may  be  at  play  when 
comparing Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries, with the  former often traditionally 
considered more tolerant than the latter. 
If  this  was  the  case,  country  or  regional  fixed  effects  could  only  capture  part  of  the 
unobservable confounding  factors, namely those affecting the constant parameter rather 
than the slope. It is therefore crucial to rule out that our estimation results do not depend on 
the  inclusion  of  specific  countries  or  larger  geographical  areas  that  are  so  intrinsically 
characterized by one of the two confessions. 
For  example,  it  could  be  that  minority  Protestant  enjoy  personal  and  environmental 
conditions  which  are  systematically  more  conducive  to  entrepreneurship  than  minority 
Catholics.  If  this  is  the  case  then  our  identification  strategy  would  fail.  However  an 
inspection of the distribution of Protestant and Catholic minorities in Europe, shows that 
Protestant  minorities  live  in  Central  and  Southern  Europe  and  Catholic  minorities  in 
Northern  Europe.  This  pattern  excludes  that  minority  Protestants  are  systematically 
advantaged in terms of education, economic growth and economic institutions that are more 
favorable  to  entrepreneurship,  actually  it  is  quite  the  opposite  as  education  attainment, 
school quality, economic growth, and rule of low are typically higher in Northern Europe.  
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We can investigate this issue further by checking how our estimation results depend on the 
inclusions of specific countries. We therefore estimate our baseline model by restricting our 
sample of countries in a number of different ways. Panel A of Table 6 displays the results 34 
 
when excluding, respectively, Scandinavian countries (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland,  in  column  1),  Mediterranean  countries  (i.e.  Italy,  Spain,  Poland,  Portugal  and 
Ireland, in column 2) and both (in column 3). The model in column 3 is therefore estimated 
only on data from countries where both Christian confessions co-exist and are characterized 
by a significant share of the religious individuals. Our main  finding is robust to such a 
dramatic reduction in sample size, despite our sample being reduced by around 20, 30 and 50 
percent, respectively (i.e. reaching a total of 28497, 24586 and 17294 observations instead of 
35789). The estimated coefficients are close to our baseline estimate, and vary from a 3.3% 
effect of Protestantism in column 1 to a 2.1% effect in column 3. The specification test is 
always respected, with no significant effect when comparing majorities.  
Pursuing further this direction, in panel B of Table 6 we check whether our findings depend 
on the inclusion of specific countries in our sample, by dropping one country at a time. 
These estimates show how our main result is not driven by any of the countries in the 
sample. The estimated effect is always positive and significant, varying from a minimum of 
2.9 percentage points to a maximum of 4.1 percentage points.  This is an indication on how 
the  systematic  difference  in  individual  attitude  towards  entrepreneurship  across  minority 
confessions does not appear to be the result of country specific patterns, but rather of a 
general tendency across European regions.  
 
7.2 Migration and Religion 
Another concern we need to take care of is the potential impact of recent migration waves 
on the geographical distribution of religious beliefs across Europe. We discuss above how 
the actual geographical pattern of Christian minorities across European regions is stable over 
the long run and closely resembles that which emerged  from the peculiar events  following 
Reformation.  This  finding  by  definition  excludes  that  cumulative  historical  migration 
patterns  may  have  played  a  significant  role  in  changing  the  geographical  map  of  the 
incidence  of  confessions  across  Europe.  However,  in  principle  it  may  be  the  case  that 
modern migration patterns could be endogenously driven by religious  factors as well as by 35 
 
the individual propensity to start or export a business abroad. In turn, this could possibly 
alter the estimated relationship between religion and entrepreneurship.  
We check  for the effect of migration in column 4 of Table 6 - Panel A by excluding all 
individuals who are first or second generation migrants, i.e. those who were born abroad or 
whose  father was born abroad. We then both recalculate our minority indicators and re-
estimate  the  model  considering  national  individuals  only.  The  differential  effect  of 
Protestantism is still  found positive ad significant and close to what  found in our baseline 
estimation,  amounting  to  around  2.6%.  Again,  no  significant  effect  is  found  when 
comparing majority individuals. In addition, when comparing the migrants’ religion with the 
predominant religion of the host country we do not  find any clear correlation. This is a 
further indication that our findings are not confounded by migration-related factors. 
 
7.3  Entrepreneurship as a Way Out of Discrimination 
Generally, entrepreneurship is more frequent among minorities because it represents a way 
out in case of discrimination. A possible objection to the validity of our results could be then 
expressed as follows. 
It is commonly maintained that the Catholic Church is quite intransigent in condemning 
norms, behaviors and conducts contrary to its principles whereas the less hierarchical and 
dispersed  Protestant  churches  look  much  more  open  and  inclusive.  Consequently,  also 
Catholic people could be more intolerant than Protestants towards other faiths or beliefs. If 
this was true, then Protestant minorities, surrounded by catholic majorities, could be over-
represented among entrepreneurs, being entrepreneurship more than an option if one is 
discriminated,  and,  symmetrically,  minority  Catholics  who  live  beside  open-minded  and 
tolerant Protestant majorities could  freely offer themselves on the labor market and  find 
more opportunities as dependent workers. As a result there should be comparatively more 
entrepreneurs  among  Protestant  than  among  Catholic  minorities,  but  this  would  have 
nothing to do with ethics or religion culture. 36 
 
In  fact, the supposed higher tolerance of Protestant churches and Protestant people is not 
empirically grounded. According to Kaplan (2007), extreme intolerance was equally common 
across  confessions  and  countries  and  lasted  for  at  least  150  years  after  the  end  of  the 
religious wars. Often Protestants were deeply intolerant, not only of Catholics but also of 
each  other  (such  as  the  burning  of  Servetus,  a  Spanish  Protestant,  in  Calvin's  Geneva 
witnesses). In Britain and Ireland the civil war and the spread of Puritanism, the catholic 
intolerance of James II and the anti-Catholic Gordon riots are examples of intolerance from 
both sides.  
Turning to present days and looking at ISSP Religion III data, we  find that 82 percent of 
Catholics and 75 percent of protestant agree with the principle that all religions deserve 
respect, and about 80 percent of both confessions’ fellows would accept that a close relative 
marries  a  person  from  a  different  religion.  In  the  ESS  data  we  have  more  specific 
information  about  discrimination,  as  respondents  declare  whether  they  are  part  of  a 
discriminated group and whether discrimination is due to religious reasons. They also declare 
how much important is, in their view, understanding other people. We use this information 
as alternative outcomes in model (12) to test whether minorities and/or majorities differ 
across confessions
26. To avoid any possible confounder related to the status of immigrant, 
we remove first and second generation immigrants from the sample. Results are displayed in 
Table 6 panel C. 
Overall, we find that Catholic and Protestant minorities are not discriminated to a different 
extent, although both report some discrimination
27. Point estimates indicate that minority 
Catholics  are  more  likely  to  belong  to  a  discriminated  group.  When  it  comes  to 
discrimination due to religious motivations, the opposite occurs. However differences are 
never significant. 
                                                 
26 As regards the importance to understand others, we define a dummy variable which takes 1 if the respondent 
declare very important or important. 
27  The same proportion of  minority Protestant and Catholics (1.7 percent) report to be discriminated on 
religious grounds. Among the remaining population, the proportion  is again equal between confessions but 
lower (0.7 percent).    37 
 
Finally, neither majorities nor minorities differ according to the importance they attach to 
understanding others.   
 
7.4 Sectoral Composition and Entrepreneurship 
In panel D of Table 6 we examine whether sectoral composition at regional level may affect 
our estimates and how. In column 1 we control  for sectoral composition at regional level 
using the EU KLEMS sectoral classification (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009). Controlling for 
sectoral  composition  is  motivated  by  possible  different  entrepreneurship  patterns  across 
industries. When accounting for the 15 major EU KLEMS industries we estimate a positive 
and  significant  differential  effect  of  Protestantism,  only  marginally  smaller  than  what 
previously found, i.e. around 2.5 percent. Our findings are robust even when we control for 
industry at the individual level (not included in the table). 
In  column  2  we  focus  on  agriculture.  Indeed,  the  agricultural  sector  is  traditionally 
characterized  by  a  high  concentration  of  self-employed  with  respect  to  the  rest  of  the 
economy,  and  agricultural  communities  are  traditionally  more  religious  than  urban 
communities. We then exclude from our sample all individuals working in agriculture, which 
amounts to dropping around 4.5% of our observations. Our point estimate is still strongly 
statistically significant and close to our previous estimate at 2.7 percentage points.  
Column 3 concentrates on our definition of entrepreneurs by excluding those self-employed 
individuals who are unpaid  family workers, i.e. those who experience a peculiar  form of 
compensation that may take other form that actual wages, such as, for example, increase in 
business value.  In our sample only around 1% of respondents (around  four hundred) are 
subject to such form of self-employment, and the effect of this exclusion on our estimated 
effect is marginal (from 3.3 to 3.2 percentage points). 
Our specification test is respected in all three columns, i.e. no significant differential effect is 
found when comparing individuals belonging to religious majorities.  
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7.5 Risk Aversion as an Explanatory Factor 
Finally, one aspect worth investigating  further is the role of risk aversion that has been 
indicated  as  one  important  ingredient  of  entrepreneurship  (see  Kihlstrom  and  Laffont 
(1979); Ekelund et al. (2005) among many others).  
In principle, being Catholic, Protestant or atheist might be correlated with several attributes 
of individual preferences. This is because both religion and some character traits are learnt in 
the family. For instance the growing literature of endogenous preferences suggests that time 
preferences (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005) or trust (Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales,	 ﾠ2008) are partly 
decided and shaped by parents. Similarly, it is reasonable to suppose that risk aversion is 
learned  in  the  family.  We  may  distinguish  two  cases  here.  On  the  one  hand,  different 
patterns  in  risk  aversion  between  Protestants  and  Catholics  may  be  the  product  of  the 
difference in cultural traits embodied by the two confessions. In this sense, the effect of risk 
aversion on entrepreneurship can be ascribed to the broader effect of religion and more 
generally  risk  aversion  could  be  one  of  the  channels  through  which  culture  may  affect 
economic choices and outcomes.  
On  the  other  hand,  risk  aversion  may  be  a  causa  prima  that  could  motivate  both  an 
entrepreneurial attitude and the choice of a particular religion. If this was the case then by 
looking  at  the  relationship  between  confessions  and  entrepreneurship  we  could  find  a 
spurious correlation.  
In order to investigate this issue  further, we have  focused on Germany and we have used 
SOEP  2004  data  to  assess  whether  there  are  any  differences  between  Catholics  and 
Protestants in terms of risk aversion in that country. The overall message of the analysis, 
discussed in detail in Appendix C, is that there are no systematic differences in terms of risk 
aversion between Catholic and Protestants. This is reassuring as any difference in the level of 
entrepreneurship between the two confessions cannot be ascribed to risk aversion. Instead 
we  find  less  conclusive  indications  regarding  the  difference  between  religious  people  in 
general and atheists. There is some evidence that religious people could be more risk-averse 
than  atheists.  For  this  reason,  in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  of  bringing  in  unobservable 39 
 
confounders  difficult  to  account  for,  in  our  analysis  we  prefer  to  always  disregard  the 
atheists and focus on the smaller but more homogenous sample of religious people.     
 
Summarizing the results of our analysis, we identify an effect of cultural factors, represented 
by a religion the individual genuinely adhere to, on the choice of being an entrepreneur. This 
effect  cannot  be  the  result  of  a  correlation  between  religious  denomination  and  socio-
economic characteristics, such as education, economic development, sectoral composition or 
institutions at regional or country level. Actually, we can exclude any systematic differences 
between individuals who generically define themselves Protestants and Catholics since no 
difference remains between Protestant and Catholic majorities after controlling  for a long 
battery  of  individual  and  regional  covariates,  in  any  of  our  specifications.  Only  when 
internalization of ethical norms and values is high, as it is the case among minorities, a 
significant difference in the impact of the two religious cultures emerges. This means that a 
historical, long lasting, religious tradition does not influence entrepreneurship per se. It is 
rather a genuine individual attachment to a specific religious culture, inherited through the 
family, that autonomously matters, in addition to all other elements we have highlighted in 
our analysis, including entrepreneurial family background. 
Why Protestantism is more  favorable to entrepreneurship than Catholicism? We can only 
speculate  at  this  stage  and  further  research  is  needed  on  this  point.  The  emphasis  of 
Protestantism on the individual, unmediated, relation with God seems to be an element 
correlated to the emergence of a strong sense of self and of self-esteem, two important 
ingredients  to  an  entrepreneur.  Moreover,  Protestantism  can  produce  a  favorable  social 
influence, i.e. the moral approbation towards success and wealth accumulation, which could 
be a  further incentive to take the risky way of entrepreneurship. As social approbation 
develops  only  if  the  surrounding  community  shares  the  same  Protestant  ethics,  this 
interpretation  fits  well  with  the  finding  that  Protestantism  is  more  conducive  of 




In  this  paper  we  suggest  a  methodology  for  identifying  the  implications  of  alternative 
cultural and social norms embodied by religious denomination on labour market outcomes 
in European regions. We test whether cultural norms represented by religious beliefs may 
affect  individual  labour  market  choices.  More  specifically,  we  investigate  the  differential 
impact of Protestantism versus Catholicism on the decision of becoming an entrepreneur by 
means  of  a  quasi-experimental  approach  based  on  the  minority  status  of  religious 
denominations across European regions.  
Differently  from other contributions, such as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), in this 
paper we concentrate on causality more than on the specific channel by which religious 
social norms may affect economic outcomes. 
In our research design we exploit the exogenous historical determination of the distribution 
of religious denominations across European regions, the stronger degree of attachment to 
religious background of religious minorities, and the homogeneous general economic and 
cultural environment European Protestant and Catholic minorities are subject to, in order to 
elicit  the  role  played  by  religious  cultural  background  on  labour  market  choices.  Our 
findings suggest that cultural background has a significant effect on individual propensity to 
become an entrepreneur in Europe. Protestantism is found to increase the chances to be an 
entrepreneur  by  around  3  percentage  points  with  respect  to  Catholicism.  This  result  is 
robust across alternative specifications, to a number of robustness checks and does not 
depend on the inclusion of specific countries in the sample.  
Our  findings are not necessarily at odds with those of Becker and Woessman (2009) since 
the  focus of our analysis is quite different  from their investigation. In addition to the time 
framework being crucially different, we analyse the implications of religious denomination 
on  the  choice  of  becoming  an  entrepreneur  among  individuals  who  display  a  certain 
adherence  to  their  creed  (i.e.  minorities),  while  Becker  and  Woessman  focus  on  the 
implications of aggregate prevalence of Protestantism on economic growth at regional level 
just after Reformation. However, our results do suggest that moral considerations, ethics and 41 
 
culture substantially enter in labour market choices, therefore providing further evidence on 
the need to take cultural elements into consideration when analysing economic behaviour.   
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Appendix A – Minorities and networks 
We estimate again equation (11), with the same controls and the same definitions of regions 
and minority. Outcome variables refer to 1) the number of close friends a) in the workplace, 
b)  who  live  near  the  respondent;  2)  respondent’s  participation  in  voluntary  local 
organization; 3) potential ability to borrow money from relatives and friends in case of need; 
4) number of times the respondent has lent money  to relatives and  friends in the current 
year; 5) to what extent relatives and friends are sources of information to find a job; 6) how 
often the respondent help someone to  find a job; 7) self-reported general trust in other 
people; 8) self-reported perception that others’ opportunism. 
We look at the difference between the coefficients of mP and mC. Such difference would 
indicate  to  what  extent  protestant  minorities  are  possibly  more  socially  connected  than 
catholic minorities. Results are reported in Table A1
28. 
 
TABLE A1 AROUND HERE 
 
Outcomes of Table A1 
Each outcome is based on a precise question of the ISSP Social Networks II survey as 
detailed below. In italic the question. 
1) Thinking about people at your work place, how many of them are close  friends of yours? We took the 
number of friends (between 0 and 60) 
2) Thinking now of people who live near you – in your neighborhood or district: How many of these people 
are close  friends of yours? We took the number of friends (between 0 and 90) 
                                                 
28 Minorities are defined over respondents’ religion, as information on religious  family background is not 
collected in ISSP Social Network II. 48 
 
3) How many other close  friends do you have – apart  from those at work, in your neighborhood, or  family 
members? Think,  for instance, of  friends at clubs, church, other like. We took the number of 
friends (between 0 and 90) 
4) People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. The list below contains different types 
of groups. For each type of group, please tick a box to say whether you have participated in the activities 
of this group in the past 12 months. We have derived a dummy variable which takes 1 if the 
respondent reported to actively participate to church or other religious organization; 
sports group, hobby or leisure club; charitable organization or group; neighborhood 
association or group ; other associations or groups.  
5) Now, suppose you needed to borrow a large sum of money. Who would you turn to  first  for help? We 
have derived a dummy variable which takes 1 if the respondent answered one of the 
following: husband, wife, partner, mother,  father, daughter, son, sister, brother, other 
blood relative, in-law relative, god-parent, close  friend, neighbor, someone you work 
with, employer. 
6-7-8) During the past 12 months, how often have you done any of the  following things  for people you 
know personally, such as relatives,  friends, neighbors or other acquaintances? a) Helped someone 
outside of your household with housework or shopping b) Lent quite a bit of money to another person ; 
d) Helped somebody to  find a job. For all items a) b) and d) we derived a dummy variable 
which  takes  1  if  the  respondent  reported  to  have  helped/lent  at  least  once  in  the 
previous 12 months.  
9) There are many ways people hear about jobs -  from other people,  from advertisements or employment 
agencies, and so on. Please indicate how you  first  found out about work at  our present employer. We 
have derived a dummy variable which takes 1 if the respondent answered one of the 
following:  from parents, brothers or sisters,  from other relatives,  from a close  friend, 
from an acquaintance.  
10-11) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the  following statements? a) There are only a  few 
people I can trust completely; c) If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you. As 
regards item a) we derived a dummy variable which takes 1 if the respondent declares to 49 
 
disagree or strongly disagree. Regarding item c) we derived a dummy variable which 
takes 1 if the respondent declares to agree or strongly agree. 
 
Appendix B – ESS Sample 
ESS sample by country and wave is described in Table B1.                              
 
Regions and Minorities in ESS data  
In order to identify religious minorities across European regions according to the definitions 
given  above,  and  to  control  for  unobservable  characteristics  of  geographical  areas  of 
residence, we  first need to define the level of regional aggregation to apply to our data. 
Ideally, regions should be comparable in terms of their population and size. The Eurostat 
NUTS classification provides four level of aggregation: NUTS 0 identify countries; NUTS 1 
macro-regions  with  a  population  between  3  and  7  million;  NUTS  2  regions  with  a 
population between 800 thousands and 3 million; NUTS 3 regions (sub-regions in most 
cases) with a population between 150 thousands and 800 thousands. Unfortunately, not all 
countries surveyed by the European Social Survey report the same NUTS level, some being 
more disaggregated (up to level 3) and some being only at level 1. Moreover, in some cases 
the number of observations at higher NUTS levels is too small to carefully measure the 
distribution of religious denominations in each region,  forcing us to aggregate downwards. 
Eventually, we have defined  four possible definitions of regional unit to apply to our ESS 
data, according to alternative aggregation criteria: 
Region 0 : each country coincides with a region; 
Region 1: NUTS 1 whenever possible, NUTS 0 otherwise; 
Region 2: NUTS 2 whenever possible, Region 1 aggregation otherwise; 
Region 3: NUTS 3 whenever possible, Region 2 aggregation otherwise.  
The number of regions in the ESS dataset is 220 under the definition Region 3, 177 under 
Region 2, 90 under Region 1  and 22 under Region 0. 50 
 
Our definition of minority states that a confession dir of an individual i residing in region r is 
considered minority if a) its market-share in region r is less than 25%; and b) the market-
share of dir is the smallest in region r. We considered alternative definitions of minority in 
our analysis. These are: (i) confession dir of an individual i residing in region r is considered 
minority if its market-share in region r is less than 25%; (ii) religion dir of an individual i 
residing in region r is considered minority if condition i holds and if dir is Protestant (resp. 
Catholic) its market-share is smaller than the share of Catholicism (resp. Protestantism); (iii) 
religion dir of an individual i residing in region r is considered minority if the market-share of 
dir is the smallest in region r. 
Our preferred definition is the most stringent, while a priori no clear ranking exists among 
the other three. In general, these alternative definitions turn out to map to a similar set of 
regions.  Only  a  few  regions  in  Germany,  UK,  Sweden  and  Latvia  are  affected  by  the 
adoption of alternative definitions of minority and only when Protestantism is considered. 
Instead, the regions reporting Catholic minorities are essentially the same across alternative 
definitions.  
Note that in order to avoid measurement errors we always exclude from our sample regions 
with less than 50 sampled respondents. However, our results never change if we include all 
regions. 
 
Appendix C – Religion and risk aversion 
Using SOEP 2004 data, we may define two measures of risk aversion. The first is an index 
of relative risk aversion (RRA) which can be derived  from a question about the amount of 
windfall money to re-invest in a lottery with specified probabilities and returns,  following 
the procedure indicated in Caliendo et al. (2007). This is an objective measure experimentally 
validated (Dohmen et al., 2005). The second is the self-reported willingness to take risks 
measured on a scale from 0 (maximal willingness) to 10 (no willingness). Rather surprisingly 
the correlation between the two measures is quite small (24 percent). The average level of 
both measures is alike across all confessions (about 2.9 for RRA and 5.6 for the willingness 51 
 
to take risk) as well as their standard deviations (1.32  for RRA and 2.30  for willingness), 
indicating that risk aversion is distributed in a similar way across confessions.  
However, a similar marginal distribution can be the resulting outcome of the combined 
correlation with many variables besides religion. There are two cases to distinguish: if risk 
aversion  is  shaped  by  the  religion  culture,  then  the  effect  of  risk  aversion  on 
entrepreneurship can be ascribed to the broader effect of religion; if instead risk aversion is a 
causa prima, then by looking at the relationship between religion and entrepreneurship we 
could  find a spurious correlation. Indeed, we have tested whether risk aversion influences 
the  decision  of  being  religious  (i.e.  Catholic  or  Protestant)  compared  to  atheist  after 
controlling  for regional (lander)  fixed effects, individual age, gender, years of education, 
marital status, employment condition, and, importantly, father and mother religion. As said, 
religious family background could influence both the religion and the degree of risk aversion 
transmitted to children. Estimates of a probit model are reported in the  first column of 
Table C1. By using RRA we cannot reject the hypothesis that risk aversion is uncorrelated 
with religiosity. Instead, when willingness to take risks is considered, the model suggests that 
more risk averse people are more likely to be religious. Furthermore, we test whether the 
degree  of  risk  aversion  is  correlated  with  the  particular  individual  confession.  We  have 
estimated a multinomial probit model where the dependent variable is individual confession 
(Atheist – the base outcome - , Catholic and Protestant), and the explanatory variables are 
the measures of risk aversion and the same controls used above. Coefficients of the two 
measures  of  risk  aversion  for  both  Catholic  and  Protestant  outcomes  are  reported  in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table C1. Their difference is in column 4. Regardless of the measure 
adopted, risk aversion influences the probability of being Catholic or Protestant to a similar 
extent. 





     
Source: Made from the public domain map "Central Europe about 1648" from the Historical Atlas by William 
R. Shepherd, at the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas.  
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Figure 2: Catholics as percentage of residents in Central Europe.   
 
 
Source: our elaboration on ESS data  
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Figure 3. Atheism, Religiousness and degree of adhesion 
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Figure 10: Proportion of self-employed – ESS data 
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Table	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠCorrespondence	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠCatholic	 ﾠdioceses	 ﾠand	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ











territories	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1618	 ﾠtotally	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ








	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Catholic	 ﾠ Protestant	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Bamberg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.589	 ﾠ 2.560	 ﾠ 46	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Archdiocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Bamberg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ





2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠEichstätt	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 870	 ﾠ 424	 ﾠ 49	 ﾠ Bishopric	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ
Eichstätt	 ﾠ
Ansbach	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ








4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Berlin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10.682	 ﾠ 563	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Archdiocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠBerlin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5.811	 ﾠ 393	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Brandeburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠDresden-ﾭ‐
Meißen	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.155	 ﾠ 141	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Saxony	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠGörlitz	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 716	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Saxony	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Freiburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13.027	 ﾠ 4.694	 ﾠ 36	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Freiburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠof	 ﾠRottenburg-ﾭ‐
Stuttgart	 ﾠ	 ﾠ










Wurttemberg	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Hamburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13.342	 ﾠ 1.591	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Archdiocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Hamburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.787	 ﾠ 389	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Mecklenburg,	 ﾠ
Lauenburg,	 ﾠ
Holstein	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ







1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ






2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Köln	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18.895	 ﾠ 8.286	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Archdiocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠKöln	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5.200	 ﾠ 2.111	 ﾠ 41	 ﾠ bishopric	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠKoln,	 ﾠ
mixed	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
mixed	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠAachen	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2.038	 ﾠ 1.137	 ﾠ 56	 ﾠ Julich	 ﾠ Koln	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠEssen	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2.557	 ﾠ 880	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ Essen	 ﾠ
Abbey,	 ﾠ
Berg	 ﾠ
Mark	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠLimburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2.358	 ﾠ 663	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ Sayn	 ﾠ Nassau,	 ﾠ
Hessen-ﾭ‐
Darmstadt	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ





4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrier	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2.468	 ﾠ 1.504	 ﾠ 61	 ﾠ archbisho
pric	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Trier	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
München	 ﾠu.	 ﾠFreising	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7.813	 ﾠ 4.914	 ﾠ 63	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ65 
 
Archdiocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
München	 ﾠund	 ﾠFreising	 ﾠ	 ﾠ




	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ








4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ







5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠPassau	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 559	 ﾠ 495	 ﾠ 89	 ﾠ Bishopric	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠPassau	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Church	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Paderborn	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12.147	 ﾠ 2.302	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Archdiocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Paderborn	 ﾠ	 ﾠ










3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ





2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠErfurt	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2.250	 ﾠ 156	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Sachsen	 ﾠ
Herzogtumer,	 ﾠ
Schwarzburg	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Diocese	 ﾠof	 ﾠMagdeburg	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2.700	 ﾠ 90	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Magdeburg	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Source: Columns (1)-(3) from German Bishops’ Conference data; Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 
1923. Importance of 1618 protestant territories is defined as: 1 = largely dominant, 2 = larger than catholic 








Table 2. Adhesion to religion and religious norms among minorities. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Number of  










                   
Protestant  0.681***  -0.0386  -0.0641**  -0.0323  -0.0189  -0.0375  -0.0486  -0.0250  -0.0138 
  (0.262)  (0.0296)  (0.0300)  (0.0333)  (0.0252)  (0.0327)  (0.0323)  (0.0312)  (0.0275) 
Minority Protestant  0.922**  0.170***  0.236***  0.120**  0.0176  0.142***  0.168***  0.130**  0.0867* 
  (0.427)  (0.0464)  (0.0475)  (0.0489)  (0.0397)  (0.0495)  (0.0506)  (0.0507)  (0.0467) 
Minority Catholic  1.685***  0.247***  0.141*  0.0622  -0.204***  0.310***  0.150*  0.218***  0.155** 
  (0.535)  (0.0694)  (0.0744)  (0.0765)  (0.0720)  (0.0639)  (0.0833)  (0.0843)  (0.0749) 
Constant  0.168  0.165**  0.342***  0.459***  0.598***  0.602***  0.548***  0.500***  0.237*** 
  (0.562)  (0.0725)  (0.0725)  (0.0781)  (0.0623)  (0.0769)  (0.0777)  (0.0752)  (0.0670) 
                   
Observations  12,869  12,869  12,896  12,268  13,179  11,669  11,566  11,397  12,614 
R-squared  0.193  0.188  0.146  0.062  0.055  0.108  0.141  0.122  0.066 
 
Note: OLS Linear Probability Model estimates of equation (1) on ISSP Religion III data. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. Sample includes only Protestant and Catholics. Gender, age, years of education, urban or 
rural  residence,  parents  religion  and  regional  fixed  effects  (NUTS  1)  are  included  as  controls.  Countries 
included: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, 







 Table 3: Proportions of Catholics, Protestants and Atheists in each country 
country  catholic  protestant  atheist 
        AT  0.66  0.04  0.30 
BE  0.42  0.01  0.57 
CH  0.33  0.32  0.34 
CZ  0.26  0.03  0.71 
DE  0.23  0.29  0.47 
DK  0.01  0.59  0.41 
EE  0.01  0.10  0.90 
ES  0.72  0.00  0.28 
FI  0.00  0.65  0.35 
FR  0.31  0.01  0.68 
GB  0.11  0.32  0.57 
HU  0.39  0.15  0.46 
IE  0.81  0.03  0.16 
IT  0.79  0.00  0.21 
LU  0.65  0.01  0.34 
NL  0.22  0.17  0.61 
NO  0.01  0.49  0.50 
PL  0.92  0.00  0.08 
PT  0.85  0.01  0.14 
SE  0.01  0.27  0.72 
SI  0.53  0.01  0.46 
SK  0.67  0.08  0.25 
        Average  0.39  0.18  0.43 
 
Note that countries are indicated by their ISO code, i.e. :  
Austria AT Italy IT Belgium BE Luxembourg LU Czech Republic CZ Netherlands NL Denmark DK Norway NO Estonia 
EE Poland PL Finland FI Portugal PT France FR Slovakia SK Germany DE Slovenia SI Spain ES Hungary HU Sweden SE 
Iceland IS Switzerland CH Ireland IE United Kingdom GB. 68 
 
Table 4: Proportions of self-employed individuals (total, with employees, with at least 10 employees) 







       
AT  0.103  0.055  0.027 
BE  0.106  0.041  0.013 
CH  0.127  0.057  0.012 
CZ  0.073  0.032  0.017 
DE  0.098  0.049  0.013 
DK  0.092  0.051  0.020 
EE  0.054  0.036  0.008 
ES  0.141  0.054  0.012 
FI  0.114  0.043  0.009 
FR  0.056  0.038  0.029 
GB  0.104  0.036  0.017 
HU  0.050  0.023  0.010 
IE  0.127  0.056  0.027 
IT  0.197  0.105  0.033 
LU  0.097  0.066  0.020 
NL  0.099  0.062  0.016 
NO  0.101  0.042  0.038 
PL  0.149  0.041  0.026 
PT  0.132  0.050  0.013 
SE  0.096  0.040  0.015 
SI  0.059  0.042  0.011 
SK  0.076  0.034  0.020 
       





Table 5 – Panel A: Religious denomination and the propensity of being entrepreneur 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplACT 
       
PROTESTANT  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
MINORITY  0.007  0.007  0.007 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
MAJORITY  -0.003  -0.002  0.004 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
PROTESTANT*MAJ.  0.019  0.019  0.013 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
PROTESTANT*MIN.  0.036***  0.035***  0.034*** 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
FOREIGN  -0.017  -0.015  -0.017 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
AGE  0.004***  0.004***  0.004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MALE  0.086***  0.087***  0.086*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
FATHER SELF EMP.  0.132***  0.132***  0.131*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
EDUCAT. YEARS  -0.001*    -0.001* 
  (0.001)    (0.001) 
MARRIED  0.027***    0.026*** 
  (0.006)    (0.006) 
WEALTH  0.103***    0.103*** 
  (0.038)    (0.039) 
       
Observations  35,789  35,789  35,789 
R-squared  0.078  0.077  0.079 
MinP-MinC  0.0333  0.0326  0.0326 
se MinP-MinC  0.0102  0.0103  0.0103 
pval MinP-MinC  0.00132  0.00172  0.00172 
MajP-MajC  0.0164  0.0166  0.0118 
se MajP-MajC  0.0165  0.0164  0.0159 
pval MajP-MajC  0.321  0.311  0.460 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: differential effect of being minority protestant compared to minority catholic, on the propensity of being an 
entrepreneur. Column 1 is the baseline model, column 2 excludes potentially endogenous variables, column 3 include 
regional  controls  (unemployment  rate,  GDP  growth,  the  extent  of  motor  ways,  population  density,  number  of 
doctors per thousand residents, proportion of graduated residents). All columns are estimated by linear probability 
model and include country and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Controls include 
whether respondent is foreign national, age, gender, whether father was self-employed, years of education, whether 
respondent is married and whether main source of income is financial. 70 
 
Table 5 – Panel B Religious denomination and the propensity of being entrepreneur: robustness checks. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplEMP 
           
PROTESTANT  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
MINORITY  0.007  0.006  0.008  0.005  0.007 
  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
MAJORITY  0.001  -0.002  -0.009  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
PROTESTANT*MAJ.  0.016  0.026  0.125  0.015  0.016 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.089)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
PROTESTANT*MIN.  0.035***  0.036***  0.038***  0.039***  0.036*** 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
FOREIGN  -0.015  -0.015  -0.017  -0.017  -0.020 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
AGE  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MALE  0.087***  0.086***  0.086***  0.086***  0.088*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
FATHER SELF EMP.  0.130***  0.128***  0.132***  0.132***  0.134*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
EDUCAT. YEARS  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001  -0.002** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
MARRIED  0.026***  0.023***  0.027***  0.027***  0.023*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
WEALTH  0.103***  0.084**  0.100***  0.103***  0.148*** 
  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.046) 
           
Observations  35,789  33,177  35,880  35,790  33,993 
R-squared  0.081  0.075  0.078  0.078  0.080 
MinP-MinC  0.0332  0.0332  0.0360  0.0360  0.0335 
se MinP-MinC  0.0106  0.0103  0.0114  0.0103  0.0108 
pval MinP-MinC  0.00203  0.00145  0.00185  0.000573  0.00225 
MajP-MajC  0.0137  0.0236  0.124  0.0122  0.0128 
se MajP-MajC  0.0168  0.0178  0.0883  0.0169  0.0177 
pval MajP-MajC  0.416  0.185  0.163  0.473  0.471 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  differential  effect  of  being  minority  protestant  compared  to  minority  catholic,  on  the  propensity  of  being  an 
entrepreneur. Column 1 includes NUTS 1 regional fixed effects instead of country fixed effects, column 2 is estimated only 
on regions where both religions are represented, minorities in column 3 are identified at NUTS 1 regional level instead of 
NUTS 3 whenever possible, minorities in column 4 are identified at NUTS 2 regional level instead of NUTS 3 whenever 
possible, column 5 include employed individuals only instead of active. All columns are estimated by linear probability model 
and include country and time  fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Controls include whether 
respondent is  foreign national, age, gender, whether  father was self-employed, years of education, whether respondent is 
married and whether main source of income is financial. 71 
 
Table 6 - Panel A: Religious denomination and the propensity of being entrepreneur: robustness checks 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplACT 
         
PROTESTANT  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.008 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
MINORITY  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.016 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
MAJORITY  -0.003  0.002  0.003  -0.010 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
PROTESTANT*MAJ.  0.000  0.017  0.000  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.010) 
PROTESTANT*MIN.  0.035***  0.024**  0.022**  0.035*** 
  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
FOREIGN  -0.018  -0.011  -0.011  0.082 
  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.062) 
AGE  0.004***  0.003***  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MALE  0.086***  0.080***  0.075***  0.088*** 
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
FATHER SELF EMP.  0.148***  0.115***  0.136***  0.136*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
EDUCAT. YEARS  -0.000  0.001  0.004***  -0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
MARRIED  0.027***  0.018***  0.015*  0.031*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
WEALTH  0.097**  0.088**  0.070*  0.105** 
  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.043) 
         
Observations  28,497  24,586  17,294  32,191 
R-squared  0.082  0.059  0.063  0.081 
MinP-MinC  0.0333  0.0218  0.0209  0.0264 
se MinP-MinC  0.0103  0.00886  0.00895  0.0120 
pval MinP-MinC  0.00136  0.0150  0.0208  0.0287 
MajP-MajC  -0.00151  0.0151  -0.00106  -0.00704 
se MajP-MajC  0.00792  0.0170  0.00825  0.0140 
pval MajP-MajC  0.849  0.376  0.898  0.615 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  differential  effect  of  being  minority  protestant  compared  to  minority  catholic,  on  the  propensity  of  being  an 
entrepreneur.  Column  1  excludes  countries  with  predominant  protestant  majority  (Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Finland), 
column 2 excludes countries with predominant catholic majority (Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Ireland), column 3 excludes 
countries  with  both  predominant  protestant  and  catholic  majority,  column  4  excludes  all  first  and  second  generation 
immigrants in estimation and calculation of minorities. All columns are estimated by linear probability model and include 
country and time  fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Controls include whether respondent is 
foreign  national,  age,  gender,  whether  father  was  self-employed,  years  of  education,  whether  respondent  is  married  and 
whether main source of income is financial.  
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Table 6 - Panel B: The differential effect of Protestantism by dropping one country at a time  
country  MinP-MinC  s.e.  pval 
       
AT  0.030  0.011  0.008 
BE  0.033  0.010  0.002 
CH  0.033  0.012  0.005 
CZ  0.031  0.010  0.003 
DE  0.033  0.011  0.004 
DK  0.033  0.010  0.001 
EE  0.033  0.010  0.001 
ES  0.031  0.010  0.003 
FI  0.033  0.010  0.001 
FR  0.035  0.010  0.001 
GB  0.033  0.010  0.002 
HU  0.041  0.011  0.000 
IE  0.029  0.010  0.004 
IT  0.034  0.010  0.001 
LU  0.032  0.010  0.002 
NL  0.038  0.011  0.000 
NO  0.033  0.010  0.001 
PL  0.033  0.010  0.001 
PT  0.029  0.009  0.002 
SE  0.033  0.010  0.001 
SI  0.033  0.010  0.001 
SK  0.039  0.012  0.001 
       
Total Sample  0.033  0.010  0.002 
 
Note: The adopted specification is that of Table 5 Panel A col. 1 
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Table 6 -Panel C: Religious denomination and the propensity of being entrepreneur: robustness checks 
 
  (1)    (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Belong to a  
discriminated group 




         
PROTESTANT  0.0142*    -0.0170***  0.0171 
  (0.00796)    (0.00635)  (0.0156) 
MINORITY  0.0241***    -0.0128  0.0176 
  (0.00802)    (0.00831)  (0.0195) 
MAJORITY  0.0363**    -0.0183**  0.00127 
  (0.0142)    (0.00900)  (0.0122) 
PROTESTANT * MIN  -0.0277*    0.0287**  -0.00361 
  (0.0142)    (0.0126)  (0.0229) 
PROTESTANT * MAJ  -0.0333**    0.0224**  -0.00712 
  (0.0160)    (0.0101)  (0.0227) 
         
Observations  69703    70844  66361 
R-squared  0.028    0.022  0.041 
MinP-MinC  -0.0135    0.0117  0.0135 
se MinP-MinC  0.00971    0.00859  0.0191 
pval MinP-MinC  0.165    0.175  0.479 
MajP-MajC  -0.0191    0.00547  0.01000 
se MajP-MajC  0.0146    0.00902  0.0209 
pval MajP-MajC  0.194    0.544  0.632 
Note: Sample composed by both the active and the inactive. First and second generation immigrants excluded. Country 
dummies are included. 
 




Table 6 - Panel D: Religious denomination and the propensity of being entrepreneur: robustness checks 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  selfemplACT  selfemplACT  selfemplACT 
       
PROTESTANT  -0.005  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
MINORITY  0.001  0.012  0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
MAJORITY  -0.003  -0.005  -0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
PROTESTANT*MAJ.  0.015  0.014  0.020 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
PROTESTANT*MIN.  0.030***  0.033***  0.034*** 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
FOREIGN  -0.028**  0.001  -0.018 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
AGE  0.004***  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MALE  0.066***  0.071***  0.087*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
FATHER SELF EMP.  0.089***  0.076***  0.137*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
EDUCAT. YEARS  0.004***  0.002**  -0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
MARRIED  0.030***  0.024***  0.027*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
WEALTH  0.077**  0.104***  0.103*** 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.039) 
       
Observations  35,789  34,174  35,360 
R-squared  0.171  0.053  0.081 
MinP-MinC  0.0247  0.0273  0.0322 
se MinP-MinC  0.00962  0.0103  0.0104 
pval MinP-MinC  0.0110  0.00864  0.00226 
MajP-MajC  0.00981  0.00852  0.0178 
se MajP-MajC  0.0149  0.0187  0.0168 
pval MajP-MajC  0.512  0.649  0.291 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  differential  effect  of  being  minority  protestant  compared  to  minority  catholic,  on  the  propensity  of  being  an 
entrepreneur. Column 1 controls for sectoral composition at regional level, column 2 excludes individuals whose main activity 
is agriculture, column 3 excludes unpaid  family workers. All columns are estimated by linear probability model and include 
country and time  fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Controls include whether respondent is 
foreign  national,  age,  gender,  whether  father  was  self-employed,  years  of  education,  whether  respondent  is  married  and 




Table A1: religious minorities and social networks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)    (8)  (9)    (10)  (11) 
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(0.093)    (0.063)  (0.071
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Observa
tions 
4,588  6,354  6,525  6,693  6,590  6,558  6,477    6,48
0 
5,937    6,593  6,483 
R-
squared 
0.118  0.072  0.085  0.216  0.108  0.070  0.056    0.10
0 
0.068    0.053  0.211 
Note: Based on ISSP survey Social Networks II. OLS estimates of equation (1) where minority catholic is replaced 
by minority (= minority catholic + minority protestant). The estimate associated to minority indicates the common 
differential impact of belonging to a protestant or catholic minority. The estimate associated to minority 
protestant indicates the differential impact between minorities. Only individuals in their working age (15-70) are 
included. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Regions used to determine minorities are as disaggregated as NUTS 2 whenever possible, excepting for Latvia 
(NUTS 3) due to the large sample size available in this survey and due to the fact that NUTS 2 is not defined 
for Latvia. All specification include: gender, age, years of education, urban or rural residence, marital status, 
number of siblings, number children under 18, number of adult sons/daughters, years of residence in the 
current place, a dummy for the Latvian region of Latgale (NUTS 3) and regional (NUTS 1) fixed effects. 
Countries included: Germany, UK, Austria, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Poland, Spain, Latvia, France, 






Table B1. European Social Survey, Participating Countries and Sample Size 
  ESS Round   
country  1  2  3  4  Total 
           
AT  2,257  2,256  2,405    6,918 
BE  1,899  1,778  1,798  1,760  7,235 
CH  2,040  2,141  1,804  1,819  7,804 
CZ  1,360  3,026      4,386 
DE  2,919  2,870  2,916  2,751  11,456 
DK  1,506  1,487  1,505  1,610  6,108 
EE    1,989  1,517  1,661  5,167 
ES  1,729  1,663  1,876  2,576  7,844 
FI  2,000  2,022  1,896  2,195  8,113 
FR  1,503  1,806  1,986  2,073  7,368 
GB  2,052  1,897  2,394  2,352  8,695 
HU  1,685  1,498  1,518  1,544  6,245 
IE  2,046  2,286  1,800    6,132 
IT  1,207  1,529      2,736 
LU  1,552  1,635      3,187 
NL  2,364  1,881  1,889  1,778  7,912 
NO  2,036  1,760  1,750  1,549  7,095 
PL  2,110  1,716  1,721  1,619  7,166 
PT  1,511  2,052  2,222  2,367  8,152 
SE  1,999  1,948  1,927  1,830  7,704 
SI  1,519  1,442  1,476  1,286  5,723 
SK    1,512  1,766  1,810  5,088 
           
Total  37,294  42,194  36,166  32,580  148,234 










Table B2: Summary statistics of regional controls 
country  unemployment rate  

















              AT  4.51  37.39  848.67  346.60  2.08  0.17 
BE  7.44  60.06  694.96  389.33  2.52  0.30 
CH  4.17  41.50  283.39  367.49  1.70  0.31 
CZ  8.03  7.90  369.89  350.44  8.81  0.12 
DE  11.00  41.48  512.23  337.19  1.62  0.25 
DK  3.64  33.15  228.74  309.83  2.90  0.31 
EE  7.01  2.29  55.88  322.01  13.29  0.33 
ES  10.58  35.52  209.43  344.96  4.01  0.27 
FI  7.76  6.68  39.97  307.92  3.63  0.35 
FR  8.30  25.41  230.40  333.38  2.45  0.25 
GB  5.17  22.82  642.83  231.35  3.51  0.28 
HU  7.18  14.00  165.17  312.56  5.03  0.16 
IE  4.47  3.24  69.21  268.67  5.33  0.27 
IT  9.64  25.10  240.31  504.59  0.72  0.11 
LU  3.90  52.76  174.89  280.53  4.52  0.21 
NL  3.55  90.33  774.50  319.18  3.68  0.28 
NO  3.53  5.48  58.02  344.90  6.39  0.33 
PL  15.34  2.22  154.91  225.06  5.90  0.16 
PT  6.97  94.22  430.54  289.37  1.46  0.13 
SE  6.13  20.18  88.77  342.02  3.29  0.29 
SI  5.95  29.27  121.03  227.56  5.38  0.22 
SK  13.67  10.77  126.85  321.06  13.73  0.14 
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Table C1: Coefficients associated to SOEP measures of risk aversion for both Catholic and 
Protestant outcomes. 
  Religious    Catholic  Protestant  difference   
RRA  -0.011    -0.020     -.0208     0.00   
p value    0.249      0.196    0.129  0.997   
willingness     0.029      0.043       0.034      0.99   
p value    0.000      0.000    0.000  0.319   
     
Note: RRA is relative risk aversion; willingness is willingness to take risks (0 is the maximum level and 10 the 
lowest level). Column (1): Probit model estimates based on SOEP 2004. Religious takes on 1  for Catholics or 
Protestants and 0  for atheists. Controls are lander dummies, age, gender, years of education, marital status, 
employment condition, and father and mother religion. Furthermore, we have tested whether the degree of risk 
aversion is correlated with the particular individual confession. Column (2) and (3): multinomial probit model 
estimates based on SOEP 2004 data. The dependent variable is individual confession (Atheist – the baseline 
outcome - , Catholic and Protestant). Same controls as in Column (1). Column (4): difference between (2) and 
(3). 
 